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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Prior to the new economic policy, which began with the liberalization of prices in 
1992, Russia experienced permanent food shortages, though Russian per capita consumption 
of major food products was relatively high. These shortages were caused by low retail prices 
that stimulated consumer demand in excess of supply. Prices in retail stores and personal 
incomes were strictly regulated by the government. However, the statistical data show that 
income growth was generally higher than price growth. 
Before the economic reforms in the early 1990s, the production side of the food 
sector and other sectors of the national economy were centrally planned. Results of 
centralized planning were low worker incentives, low input productivity, poor quality of 
products, extensive waste, and a centralized system of output procurement and input 
distribution. This production system, which consisted of large agricultural enterprises 
(sovkhozes and kolkhozes), has been transforming very slowly. The first stage of farm 
reorganization mainly involved superficial rather than substantial changes. Agricultural 
enterprises were required to register in accordance with new legislation, which meant in 
actuality that they simply changed their names to "joint-stock companies," "companies with 
limited responsibility," or "cooperatives," without significant changes in production or 
management structures. The organization, the management, and incentive systems for these 
farms have only begun to change as they have been forced to rely more on self-financing and 
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have become more responsible for marketing their outputs. 
Since the economic reforms began, the main development has been the gradual 
transformation of the state procurement system, allowing for a growing share of farm outputs 
to be marketed through emerging new market channels. These new channels, however, are in 
the initial stages of formation and often involve inefficient barter arrangements. The system 
of commodity exchanges for supporting domestic markets has also been slow in developing. 
Agrarian reform has promoted the creation of private farms but their development has been 
limited by economic conditions. By the end of 1994, 279,000 private farms were established, 
and they produce o nly 3 percent of total agricultural output. 
Furthermore, the agricultural sector still suffers from the absence of important 
institutions including land markets, a legal and regulatory framework for the financial and 
banking system, market information services, and adequate social welfare programs fo r those 
individuals unable to adjust to the reform-induced economic dislocations in the countryside. 
Evidence is emerging that indicates that market fo rces are beginning to work in the 
Russian agricultural economy. Although the restructuring of large agricultural enterprises and 
the development of peasant farms and land reform have been limited, the general economic 
reforms have created the beginnings of a market environment for agricultural goods and 
services. Price liberalization, demonopolization of international trade, and a more balanced 
fiscal and monetary policy have stimulated a substantial restructuring of food consumption, 
agricultural production, and trade. Since 1992, a balance between supply and demand for 
agricultural products has been established. Consumer demand has become the driving force 
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for production and trade. 
In the crop sector, producers have sharply reduced input use. Farms have responded to 
price liberalization by using inputs more efficiently. Yields have fallen proportionally less than 
input use. However, the current structure of the livestock sector is generally inefficient for 
production in the new economic environment. As a result, both the numbers of livestock and 
poultry, and production levels have declined significantly in recent years. 
Since prices were liberated, consumer prices have increased more than the average 
income, thereby lowering the average real incomes of citizens. Consumers have reduced their 
demands for meat and other livestock products and have switched to less expensive foods 
such as cereal products and potatoes. However, the average total caloric intake of the Russian 
population has not changed significantly. 
The reforms have dramatically altered Russian foreign trade in agricultural products. 
Russia has sharply reduced its grain imports. In 1992, grain imports totaUed 29 mln. tons. In 
1994, they fell to 2 million tons. At the same time, Russia has become an importer oflarge 
quantities of high-value products including meat products, chocolate bars, convenience 
foods, etc. In 1994, meat product imports were 5 times larger than in 1993 : 854 thousand 
tons and 159 thousand tons, respectively (Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995, p.435). 
1.2 Pro bl ems 
Economic reforms have changed the nature of agricultural policy. Before the 
reforms the agricultural policy was a part of the general centrally planned system. The main 
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goal of this system was to maintain supplies of food at fixed , low prices for fina.l consumers. 
Predetermined consumption quantities were used as planning targets. The production system 
was created and managed to satisfy this goal. Agricultural enterprises received a plan of 
production and a plan of marketing together with fixed prices for outputs and inputs. Thus, 
the agricultural policy resulted from goals of maintaining both farm incomes and low and 
stable food prices coupled with production targets. 
The general belief at the time of the reforms was that th.is system was inefficient and 
needed to be changed. To make production more efficient, agricultural producers required 
free pricing and marketing for outputs without production and procurement plans from the 
federal govenunent. 
During the economic reforms prices were freed and production plans were 
eliminated. However, agricultural producers found that in the framework of the new 
economic environment their enterprises became unprofitable and could not survive without 
continued external support. Consumers also reacted negatively to the increasing food prices. 
The result was a transitional agricultural policy based on two driving forces: providing 
consumers with "socially acceptable" prices, and providing production units with economic 
conditions suitable for profitable production and survival. 
One aspect of the economic reforms was to give the regional govenunents more 
freedom . The federal govenunent rejected pressures to establish national price controls in the 
retail sector to satisfy consumers. However, some regional govenunents introduced policies 
to limit prices for basic food products. Meanwhile, agricultural producers became more 
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organized and forced both the federal and local governments to initiate programs of support. 
A variety of these programs have been introduced: direct subsidies, government purchases, 
preferential credits, import tariffs, etc. However, the situation in the agricultural sector has 
not improved in response to these policies and subsidies. Production has been declining, debts 
of farm enterprises have been growing, and food imports have become larger and larger 
although grain imports have declined .. 
Reacting to this situation, agricultural producers have pushed for added support. 
However, the federal and local governments have been unable to provide the "required" level 
of funding. Experts and governmental officials understand that the main problem is the 
inefficient structure of agricultural production and of the industries that provide inputs to 
agriculture. In general, the efforts and programs introduced to make policy and institutional 
changes have not brought significant results in terms of sector performance. 
Agricultural policy has also been contradictory in nature. Often goals were not 
coordinated with the tools, and the results were the opposite of those intended. Agricultural 
policy measures were often characterized as "emergency care" without serious analysis and 
preparation., without ta.king into consideration the new economic environment and new 
incentives for consumer and producer behavior. For example, the introduction of 
preferential credits led to corruption and use of these financial resources for other than 
agricultural production purposes. 
There has also been a problem in measuring the economic effects of agricultural 
policies. A variety of methods have been developed to estimate the impact of agricultural 
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policies in other market-oriented economies. However, Russia is not a country with a 
developed market economy. That is why, the methods and approaches acceptable in other 
countries produced results that are sometimes not reliable in Russia. Furthermore, 
applications of standard, internationally recognized methods such as producer subsidy 
equivalents as measures of support for agriculture may provide an incorrect representation of 
the situation in the agricultural sector of Russia. 
Another problem with policy formation has been an unsophisticated view that 
government interventions necessarily cause economic losses and reductions in the efficiency 
of production and consumpti.on processes. However, this view does not reflect the problem 
of market failures. In the case of market failures, government policy can play role in more 
efficient allocation of resources. The government intervenes to support markets and reduce 
economic and social losses. This situation (market failure) is typical fo r economies in 
transition from centrally planned to market economic environments. 
If one considers an ideal free market situation, several factors can cause failure: eg. 
imperfect competition, external economies, and government intervention. The same factors 
apply when describing market failures for transition economies where enterprises enter the 
market without changing the structure inherited from a centrally planned economy. For large 
agricultural enterprises there are no opportunities for free entry and exit. They have large 
fixed capital created to produce a particular variety of agricultural products. Opportunities to 
change this structure are limited, due to an absence of asset markets, and may require new 
investments. In the United States, agriculture is becoming more and more concentrated 
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foUowing gradual changes in the economy. In Russia, however, the level of concentration in 
agriculture does not reflect the economic condition after the reforms. Moreover, Russian 
agricultural producers have to compete with foreign producers who are better equipped to 
survive in the market framework. 
In Russia, smaller agricultural production units do not have large fixed capital but 
their abifay to move from agriculture to another economic activity is limited. In general, the 
labor resources employed in small agricultural units cannot be easily employed by other 
sectors of the economy. Also, externalities are significant to their business activities. For 
example, the weU-being of private subsidiary farms and private (peasant) farms depends on 
the activities and performance of large agricultural enterprises. 
Russian agriculture is a product of decades of a centrally planned system. The 
experience during the first few years of economic reform has shown that the production 
infrastructure has barely adapted to the new economic environment. The absence of 
government support could lead to an economic disaster for the sector and related industries. 
Therefore, government policy in some cases can be considered as a set of measures to fix 
these market failures. Also, agricultural policy analysis should consider situations of market 
failure in order to accurately estimate the degree to which the Russian government should 
intervene in the sector. 
Since the beginning of the reforms, government policy has targeted support toward 
large agricultural enterprises. However, during the economic reform the structure of 
agricultural production has moved toward smaller enterprises. Thus, this strategy does not 
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necessarily support the entire agricultural sector. Therefore, agricultural policy may need to 
be altered toward the new realities in production and consumption. 
1.3 Objectives 
The primary goal of this thesis is to analyze the agricultural policy in Russia during the 
first years of transition, the early 1990s, using the methods and instruments of market 
economic theory. The specific objectives are: 
1. To describe the general development of the national economy and agricultural 
sector in Russia in the early 1990s; 
2. To provide an analysis of the transitional agricultural programs using standard 
microeconomic theory; 
3 . To estimate the overall effect of agricultural policy on the sector using 
producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs); and 
4 . To evaluate the implications of this policy analysis and PSE estimations for 
Russian agriculture. 
1.4 Organization 
This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter l explains the background and 
problems of Russian agriculture, and objectives of the study. Chapter 2 presents a 
quantitative review of the developments in the Russian national economy and the agricultural 
sector in the early 1990s, including a description of farm structure, shifts in production, and 
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changes in consumption and foreign trade. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of major 
agricultural programs: price supports, input subsidies, farm credits, and import tariffs. 
Chapter 4 discusses the problems of the application of PSE methodo logy to Russian 
agriculture and repo rts the results of PSE calculations for the sector during the period from 
1992 to 1994 . Chapter 5 summarizes the major conclusions of the study and includes 
proposals fo r po licy and further research. 
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CHAPTER 2. AGRICULTURE AND IBE FOOD MARKET IN RUSSIA 
2.1 Agriculture and the national economy 
Historically, the agriculture has occupied a significant part of the Russian economy. In 
1990, before the economic reforms began, agriculture produced 16 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP). About 13 percent of the national labor force was and remains in 
agriculture. Twenty six percent of population continues to reside in rural areas and 
agricultural enterprises remain the major employers in these areas (Table 2 .1). 
Since the introduction of new economic policy in Russia in the early 1990s, the 
macroeconomic conditions for agriculture have changed dramatically. The abolishment of the 
centrally planned economy and the introduction of market economic structures have affected 
the sectors of the national economy in different ways. The absence of production and 
procurement plans has given managers of agricultural enterprises freedom to make their own 
production and marketing decisions. However, they immediately fou nd that they had lost the 
customary markets. Before the economic reforms, the state has been the main buyer of 
agricultural commodities. In accordance with the new "rules of the game," the agricultural 
enterprises in Russia were given the freedom to produce and the freedom to sell at prices that 
cleared the market. 
The macroeconomic changes have also had a significant impact on the Russian 
agricultural sector. During the period 1990-94, prices rose sharply. 
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Table 2.1 . Agriculture and the national economy, 1990 through 1994. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Agricultural share of GDP,% 15.5 13.8 7.4 8.4 
Rural population, mil. 38.7 39.0 39.8 39.9 
Percentage of the total population 26.0 26.0 26.7 26.9 
that is rural 
Employed in agriculture, mil. 9.7 9.7 10.1 10. l 
Percentage of total employment 12.9 13 .1 14.0 14.3 
that is in agriculture 
Sources: 
Social and economic performance of Russia. 1993-1994, p.27 
Production and economic data on agroindustrial complex of Russia in 1994, p.5 
Russian Statistical Yearbook. 1994, p.61 
Statist ical Handbook 1995. States of the Former USSR, p.419 
1994 
6.5 
39.9 
26.9 
10.1 
14.6 
However, price increases have not been the same in other sectors of the economy. Prices fo r 
agricultural commodities have experienced relatively low growth. During the period 1990-94, 
industrial prices increased approximately 3 times more than agricultural prices, construction 
prices - 3 .5 times, and transport tariffs - 5 times (Table 2.2). As a result, the agricultural share 
in the GDP fell from 15. 5 percent in 1990 to 6. 5 percent in 1994. At the same time, the 
industry share of the GDP decreased from 43 percent to 28 percent, and the share of services 
increased from 32 to 50 percent of the GDP. These structural changes favoring the service 
industries can be positively interpreted because this sector of the economy is likely to lead the 
transition to a market economy. 
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Table 2.2 Price deflators for GDP, 1990 through 1994 (1990=100) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total GDP 100 229 3635 35918 150933 
Industry 100 244 3719 43290 151349 
Construction 100 258 3662 40123 189122 
Transport 100 179 3112 37648 26966 1 
Agriculture 100 200 1596 17238 54330 
Source: Statistical Handbook 1995. States of the Fonner USSR, p.425 
The important fact is that agricultural production measured in real prices has had the 
lowest production decrease among large sectors of the national economy. During the period 
1990-1994, GDP in real prices fell by 3 5 percent, industry output - 4 7 percent. Agricultural 
output during the same period decreased by 29 percent (Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3 National and sector indices of production, 1990 through 1994 
(1990= 100) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Gross Domestic Product 100 
Industrial output 100 
Agricultural output: 100 
- crop production 100 
- livestock production 100 
Sources: Russian Federation in 1992, p. 14 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1994. p.12 
95 81 74 
92 75 67 
91 87 77 
100 95 92 
93 82 77 
Social-economic performance of the Russian Federation in 1993, p.7 
65 
53 
71 
90 
70 
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One of the main effects of economic refonn for the crop sector has been a large drop 
in input use (fertilizer, pesticides, machinery, and fuel) . Before the economic reforms began, 
the government heavily subsidized input use. As a result, input use per unit of production 
was high compared to other countries. Since the introduction of a market economy, the 
efficiency of the agricultural sector has increased. The use of external inputs in agriculture 
measured in physical units has fallen at a greater rate than production. Therefore, the 
efficiency of resource use has been increasing. The data in Table 2.4 demonstrate this effect. 
In the agricultural sector, the relative efficiency of production for almost all major resources 
has increased. For the period from 1990 to 1993, the per unit consumption of gasoline 
dropped by 57 percent, diesel fuel by 27 percent, etc. 
2.2 Farm structure 
The common belief among foreign researchers is that agricultural output in Russia is 
being produced by large agricultural enterprises (sovkhozes and kolkhozes). However, in 
general, this assumption is not correct. 
At present, there are three forms of agricultural enterprises in Russia (fable 2 .5) . 
One group consists of 25,000 large agricultural enterprises (LAE). LAEs have an average 
agricultural area of 5800 ha1 and a labor force of 300 employees. In 1994, LAEs have 
produced about 60 percent of the agricultural output. Approximately 38 percent of total 
output is produced by private subsidiary farms (PSF) consisting of 16.5 million 
1 1 ha = 2.47 acre 
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Table 2 .4 Efficiency of agricultural production, 1990 through 1993 
(physical units of resources per unit of gross output) 
1990 1991 1992 
Electric power supply 0.65 0.73 0.80 
Gasoline 0. 11 0.11 0.11 
Diesel fuel 0.19 0.20 0.19 
Mineral fertilizer 0. 11 0.10 0.06 
Organic fertilizer 4.68 3.58 3.05 
Purchase of tractors 1.40 1.35 0.74 
Purchase of grain combines 0.37 0.33 0.19 
Purchase of trucks 0.95 0.86 0.55 
Sources: calculated by author based on data in the Russian Statistical 
Yearbook, 1995. 
1993 
0.82 
0.07 
0.15 
0.04 
2 .73 
0.46 
0.17 
0.27 
Table 2.5 Number of agricultural producers, 1990 through 1994 (thousand) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Large agricultural enterprises 25.8 25 .5 26.6 26.9 
Private subsidiary farms 16256 17128 19288 16553 
Peasant farms 4.4 49.0 182.8 269.9 
Sources: 
1994 
26.8 
16582 
279.2 
Production and economic data on agroindustrial complex ofRussia in 1994, pp. 34 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1994. pp. 343, 346, 361 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995. p. 356 
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produced on PSFs is being marketed. The revenue from private production provides a 
significant part of household incomes. 
About 2 percent of total output is produced by the new private farms 
(peasant farms) , which have an average area of 40 ha and an average labor force of 3 
persons. The first peasant farms were established in 1990 after the introduction the Jaw 
"On peasant farms." As of 1994, 279,000 peasant farms were registered. However, some 
of them do not produce a significant quantity of agricultural commodities. Moreover, the 
development of this sector of agricultu re has slowed considerably. In 1994 , the number 
of newly created farms was about the same as the number of farms that were liquidated, 
demonstrating that not all peasant farms can survive as private businesses under current 
economic conditions. 
In accordance with the existing land cadastre, most agricultural land is owned by 
LAEs (Table 2.6). PSFs own a small share of the land compared with their share in 
production. Often this situation is interpreted as an indicator of the extremely high efficiency 
of these farms. However, in general this conclusion is not correct. First of all, the land 
cadastre lists land plots that are officially registered to particular households (usually land 
around a house). But, at the same time, rural families also make extensive use of land plots 
that are owned by LAEs. The common practice is to use land on LAEs in accordance with 
"informal" agreements. There is no procedure to include this information in official statistics. 
As a result, to tal land use by PSFs is underestimated. 
During the transition period, significant changes have occurred in the structure 
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Table 2.6 Distribution of agricultural land by fann type, 1990 through 1994 (mil. ha) 
1990 199 1 1992 1993 1994 
Large agricultural enterprises 202.4 186.3 162.8 157.9 155.8 
Private subsidiary fanns 3.2 4.6 6.8 5.8 6.1 
Peasant farms 0.2 2.1 7.8 11.3 11.9 
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995. p. 352, 356, 357 
of agricultural production among various types of producers. The share of PSFs in total 
agricultural output increased from 24 percent in 1990 to 38 percent in 1994 (Table 2.6). 
Certain production relationships and even a distribution of roles in agriculture exist between 
LAEs and PSFs. LAEs produce most of the grains (94 percent). Meanwhile, PSF are the 
major producers of potatoes (82 percent) and vegetables (64 percent), and a significant 
portion of animal products (Table 2.8). 
Agricultural producers have become more specialized during the period of economic 
refonn. The LAE share in the production of potatoes became insignificant and PSF share in 
Table 2. 7 Share of agricultural output by farm type, 1990 through 1994 
( percent of total output) 
1990 1991 1992 
Large agricultural enterprises 76 72 66 
Private subsidiary fanns 24 28 33 
Peasant farms - - 1 
Sources: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995 . p. 3 51 
1993 1994 
63 60 
35 38 
2 2 
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Table 2 .8 Production shares by farm type in 1993 (percent) 
Large agricultural . Private subsidiary Peasant farms 
enterprises farms 
All grains 94.2 0 .6 5.2 
Potatoes 16.5 82.5 1.0 
Vegetables 34.5 64 .5 1.0 
Meat 59.4 39.5 1.1 
Milk 64.2 34.7 l. l 
Eggs 73 .0 27.0 0 .0 
Sources: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1994 . p.353, 365. 
animal production has been increased substantially. From 1990 to 1994 the number of cattle 
on LAEs decreased by 26 percent, hogs - 40 percent, sheep - 44 percent. At the same time, 
the numbers of animal on PSFs has increased : cattle by 26 percent, hogs by 27 percent, and 
sheep by 9 percent (Appendix A, Table A. l , p.98). 
However, the different types of agricultural producers do not act independently. 
Usually, LAEs provide substantial resources to support production on PSFs. The 
contribution of resources by LAEs is made in the fo rm o f additional land fo r pasture, feed 
supply (free or at preferential prices), machinery rental, and fuel with preferential prices. Ths 
cooperation is mutually beneficial because LAEs can obtain input supply more easily than 
PSFs, while the efficiency of input use on private farms is sometimes higher than on LAEs in 
the current economic environment. As a result of this redistribution of resources, PSFs have 
increased their overall production by 15-20 percent. Meanwhile, production of the LAEs has 
fallen by 43 percent (Table 2 .9). 
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Table 2.9 Indices of production by fann type, 1990 through 1994 ( 1990= 100) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
All producers 100 95 86 83 76 
Large agricultural enterprises 100 9 1 75 68 57 
Private subsidiary farms 100 109 118 121 115 
Sources : 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1994. p.341 
Social-Economic Performance of Russia. 1993-1994. p.62 
2.3 Shifts in production of agricultural commodities 
A general feature of the Russian agricultural sector during the transition period has 
been a drop in the production of almost all commodities. However, these tendencies differ 
from product to product . The annual average production of wheat during 1991 -94 
compared to 1986-90 dropped by I 0 percent while vegetable production decreased by 
almost twice this percentage. Only the production of potatoes remained stable at about 36 
million tons (Table 2 .10). 
A major portion of the drop in crop production is related to a reduction of the total 
planted area. In 1994 agricultural producers used 105 million ha of arable land compared with 
118 million ha in 1990 (Appendix A, Table A.2). Crop y1elds have not changed significantly. 
For example, the annual average grain y1elds in 1991-94 were comparable to those in 1986-
90. Only the sugar beet y1eld fell significantly during the period, dropping from 225 
centner/ha2 to 167 centner/ha (Appendix A, Table A.3). It is important to emphasize that at 
21 centner = 0.1 metric ton 
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Table 2.10 Production of major agricultural commodities, 1986 through 1994 (mil. tons) 
1986- 1991 1992 1993 1994 1991-
1990* 1994* 
Al l grains 104 89 107 99 81 94.0 
Wheat 44 39 46 44 32 40.3 
Sunflower seed 3 .1 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.9 
Sugar beet 33 24 26 26 14 22.5 
Potatoes 36 34 38 38 34 36.0 
Vegetable 8.1 5.6 4.5 3.4 3.1 4.2 
Fruit and berries 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.7 2.1 2.5 
Meat (liveweight) 14.8 14.5 12.9 11.9 10.9 12.6 
Milk 54 52 47 46 43 47.0 
Eggs (mil.) 48 47 43 40 37 41.8 
Wool 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.2 
* - annual average 
Source: Production and Economic Data on the Agro-industrial Complex of Russia in 1994, 
part 1, pp. 11, 19 
the same time the use of fertilizer has fallen by almost I 0 times. However, only sugar beet 
production was sigruficantly affected by this drop in fertilizer use. 
Animal agricultural production has undergone more dramatic changes. Since the 
reform began, meat production has fallen about 50 percent, milk production - 30 percent, 
egg production - 23 percent, wool production - 54 percent. This drop in the production of 
animal products has been connected mainly with the decrease of inventories, which have 
fallen about 20 percent. In addition, contrary to the stable productivity of crops, the 
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productivity of animal herds fell substantially. In 1994, milk yield per caw was 21 percent 
lower than in 1990. The unit productivity of cattle herds in meat production has decreased by 
26 percent (Appendix A, Table A.3). 
These tendencies in animal production can be interpreted as a result of deliberate state 
policy to expand the sector during the past decades. The number of animals increased more 
than 60 percent from 1970 to 1990. However, the growth of domestic feed production was 
not adequate to support the increased herd. To accommodate growing animal production, the 
former Soviet government substantially increased imports of feed. When the reform began, 
the Russian federal government stopped the centralized import of feed. The animal sector 
faced a dramatic deficit of feed and the associated increase of feed prices on the domestic 
market. As a result, agricultural producers decreased production on large animal complexes 
that require a massive external supply of feed , including feed concentrates. 
Animal production has gradually shifted to the PSFs which were able to organize 
efficient production of animal commodities using available resources. To a large extent these 
resources were available to the PSFs as a result of in-kind payment to workers on the LAEs. 
2.4 Changes in food consumption 
Since the economic reform began, consumer prices fo r food have ri sen substantially, 
more fully reflecting the real, unsubsidized cost of production. In fact, prices rose not only for 
foodstuffs, but for all consumer goods and services. The aggregate growth in consumer 
prices has exceeded income growth, thereby reducing real incomes (Table 2. 11). In 1992, 
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Table 2.11 Indicators of per capita consumer income and inflation, 1991 through 1994 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Income, thousand rubles 0.45 4.0 45 .2 206.3 
Income growth (to previous year,%) .. . 888 1130 455 
Consumer Price Index (to previous year) ... 1310 940 320 
Cumulative income growth 1 9 99 452 
Cumulative CPI I 13 123 394 
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook. 1994, p.80, 296 
when price liberalization began, the difference between income growth and inflation was the 
most significant. Real income dropped by almost 50 percent. However, in 1993 and 1994 the 
average level of inflation was lower than income growth. As a result, real income gradually 
increased during this period. 
Data from budget surveys show that per capita consumption of meat and meat 
products in 1994 was down about 10 percent from 199 1; milk consumption - 16 percent. 
Consumption of vegetables and fish products experienced the most significant decrease: 25 
percent and 30 percent, respectively. Consumption of cereal products rose by 10 percent, and 
consumption of potatoes rose by 26 percent (Table 2.12). 
Despite the shifts in food consumption patterns, average total caloric intake has 
changed little on average. Daily caloric intake decreased from 2430 kcal in 199 1 to 2310 in 
1994 . The share of animal products in total calo ric intake decreased from 34 percent to 31 
percent during the same period. However, certain social groups, particularly those on fixed 
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Table 2.12 Annual per capita consumption of food products, 199 1 through1994 
(based on budget surveys, kg) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Cereal products (bread, etc) 100.6 103.9 107.4 110.4 
Potatoes 98 . l 106.6 112.3 123 .6 
Vegetables and gourds 86.4 78.0 76.3 65 .0 
Fruits and berries 34.5 29.3 30.9 32. 1 
Meat and meat products 65 .3 57.9 57.3 59.0 
Milk and milk products 348.5 294.2 305.l 294.0 
Eggs, items 229 243 236 215 
Fish and fish products 14. l 11.5 11.3 9.8 
Sugar and confectionery 29. l 26.4 29. l 32.0 
Oil and o ther greases 6.2 6.8 7.4 5.8 
Source: Social-Economic Performance of Russia. 1993-1 994. pp.208-209 
1994/ 
1991 
1.10 
1.26 
0.75 
0.93 
0.90 
0.84 
0.94 
0.70 
l. 10 
0.94 
incomes (such as pensioners), have seen a major decline in the quality of their diets. 
The allocation of the consumer budget has changed as well. The share of a 
household's spending for foodstuffs has increased from 3 8 percent in 1991 to 44 percent in 
1994 (Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995. p. 98). 
2.5 Agricultural trade 
Two major features characterize the changes in agricultural markets in Russia. First, 
the centralized procurement system controiled by the federal government has essentially been 
eliminated. Second, domestically produced agricultural commodities have been substituted 
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extensively for imported food products. 
Before the economic reform, the government was dominant in the agricultural 
markets. The procurement system was intended to maintain government control of the 
country's accumulation and distribution system. The federal government defined procurement 
prices and quantities for marketed commodities, except in the case of city markets. 
One of the goals of agrarian reform has been to liberalize agricultural markets . In 
1992, the Russian federal government lifted wholesale and retail price controls fo r a 
significant number of commodities. At the same time, the procurement system was 
restructured. The federal government continued to purchase grains, but agricultural 
producers were not obligated to sell grains to the government. They did, in fact, because the 
government owned all of the elevators. In 1994, the quantity of grain that agricultural 
producers sold to local and federal governments was only 36 percent as much as in 1986-90. 
The governments were buying insignificant quantities of sugar beets, sun.flower seeds, 
vegetables and potatoes by 1994 (Table 2.13). 
Currently, the purpose of state procurement is to ensure a sufficien t food supply to 
major cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, etc.), to some northern and far eastern territories, 
and to the military. At the same time, regional governments have become more active 
buyers of wheat from local and other agricultural enterprises. The main purpose of local 
government purchases is to secure an appropriate supply of bread and cereal products to 
local cities and towns. Thus, the governments remain, in a changed form, a major actor in the 
markets. 
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Table 2 .13 Government purchase of agricultural commodities, 1986 through 1994 (mil. tons) 
1986- 1991 1992 1993 1994 1994/ 
1990* 86-90 
All grains 34.3 23 .6 26.1 28.2 12.4 0.36 
Wheat 17.9 13. l 12.6 15.2 8.1 0.45 
Sunflower seed 2.4 1.8 1.2 0.7 0.2 0.08 
Sugar beet 28.8 18.7 10.7 7.1 0.9 0.03 
Potatoes 8 4.8 3 1. 7 0.5 0.06 
Vegetable 7.4 4.5 3 2.1 1.5 0.20 
Meat (liveweight) 11 9 7 6 4 .7 0.43 
Milk 39 34.2 26. l 24.6 18.9 0.48 
Eggs (billion) 33 .9 30.5 24.3 24.3 20.4 0.60 
Wool, thousand tons 11 0 10 1 65 70 73 0.66 
* - annual average 
Source: Russian Statistical Yearboo~ 1995 . pp.364, 373 
Grain exchanges and private commercial firms have appeared as new channels of 
accumulation and distribution. In some regions they play a significant role in trading wheat 
and other grains. In the early 1990s, about 200 organizations were established that called 
themselves "commodity exchanges." However, they have been gradually transformed into 
trading companies. In 1994, only a few of these organizations even somewhat resembled 
western commodity exchanges. However, the trade on grain exchanges is currently not 
developing because the wheat market is mainly monopolized by governmental agencies 
and by so called joint-stock companies, which were established on the basis of facilities of 
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former state procurement and processing enterprises. 
Traditionally, a large part of production has been used for in kind payment to 
workers. Workers use their shares of produced grain mainly to feed their own animal. 
Typically, an agricultural worker has one or two cows, a few steers, a few pigs , sheep, 
and poultry. These animals are raised on subsidiary plots and account for major shares of 
private production. 
A large amount of traded wheat is sold on local wholesale markets. These markets 
include sales and exchanges between farm s or between farms and elevators or processors. 
The conditions of these sales are mostly unknown to the public. Many are made using barter 
to avoid taxation or to limit government involvement. 
Despite progress in the deregulation of Russia's agricultural markets, barriers remain 
that prevent the creation of a liberalized market for agricultural commodities. Many regional 
authorities artificially maintain local food prices at lower levels through subsidies, obligatory 
procurements, and restrictions on commodity movement. The ro le of the local governments 
has become important with the increase in their responsibilities fo r distributing subsidies and 
credits. 
Another important feature of agricultural trade in Russia is that imported agricultural 
products continue to play a significant role in foreign trade, and provide a substantial share of 
the supply of food products to the domestic market. Since economic refonns began, the total 
volume of imported agricultural commodities has fallen significantly from about 17 billion 
USD in 1990 to 6 billion USD in 1993. However, the share of these commodities still equals 
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Table 2.14 Import and export of agricultural commodities, 1990 through 1994 
1990 199 1 1992 1993 1994 
Agricultural import, bln. USD 16 .6 12.4 9 .6 5.9 8.6 
Share of agricultural import, % 20.3 27.9 26.0 22.2 30.4 
Agricultural export, bln. USD 1.5 l.3 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Share of agricultural export, % 2.1 2.6 3 .9 3.8 4.2 
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook. 1995, p.432 
more than 20 percent of total imports. Moreover, there is a trend to increase the import of 
agricultural commodities. For example, in 1994, agricultural commodities and foods reached 
30 percent of total imports. At the same time, the value of agricultural export has changed 
little . In 1990, Russia expo rted 1.5 billion USD in agricultural commodities, and in 1994 it 
exported 2.1 billion doUars. Meanwhile the share of agricultural exports in total export rose 
from 2 . 1 percent to 4.2 percent (Table 2. 14). 
The economic reform has significantly restructured the composition of foreign 
agricultural trade. While Russia has substantially decreased imports of bulk commodities, eg. 
feed grains, its imports of high-value food products, eg. animal products, have surged. 
In 1994, Russian grain imports fell to only about 2 milLion tons compared with 29 
million tons in 1992. The new economic policy of the Russian government has played a 
major role in this change. Stricter fiscal and monetary policies, along with a large foreign debt, 
have ended the practice of providing subsidized resources for domestic consumers, including 
agricultural enterprises as consumers of feed grain. In addition, a strong agrarian lobby has 
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pressured the government to reduce grain imports. Agricultural producers have tried to force 
the federal government to use its funds to support Russian fanners, rather than purchasing 
grain from abroad. 
During the same period, the imports of high-value products rose sharply. The import 
of animal products increased by nearly two times. For example, poultry meat imports 
surged from 46,000 tons in 1992 to about 500,000 tons in 1994 and 800,000 tons in 1995 
(Appendix A, Table A. 7, p. l 05). There are three major factors that have influenced this 
process . The refonn-induced emergence of a new upper class has contributed significantly to 
the rise in Russia's demand for high quali ty food . The second factor has been the appreciation 
of the real ruble/dollar exchange rate. The inflation rate in Russia has exceeded exchange rate 
growth. Russian incomes measured in doUars have increased and purchasing power of 
consumers for foreign goods has risen. The third factor has been that liberalization of foreign 
trade has enabled private traders to respond quickly to the changing demand for foreign as 
well as domestic goods. 
It is important to note that the growth and change in the structure of agricultural and 
food imports has taken place in spite of a relatively high level of import tariffs. Due to the 
pressure from the agrarian lobby, the government imposed a 15 to 20 percent import tariff for 
meat and dairy products, vegetable oil, sugar, and butter. Nevertheless, Russia is now the 
largest importer of U.S. poultry meat, and the second-largest importer of U.S. pork. These 
trends will likely continue until the refonns are consolidated, especially in the processing and 
distribution sectors. 
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CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS 
3.1 Background 
An analysis of agricultural policy in Russia during the recent period of economic 
reforms cannot be undertaken without taking into consideration previous agricultural 
development. The agricultural policies of past decades that were carried out under the 
centrally planned system created an economic structure and a system of incentives inconsistent 
a market economy. In the early 1990s, the Russian agricultural sector was a highly 
concentrated and increasingly inefficient system of production and distribution. The food 
market was highly distorted by governmental policies of controlling prices at relatively low 
levels. Since the mid 1960s, sustaining low food prices and highly concentrated agricultural 
production has required larger and larger subsidies, resulting in severe structural imbalances 
in the food and agricultural economy. 
These imbalances were not evident in the framework of a centrally planned system. 
Only when Russia launched its economic reform, after the dissolution of the USSR, did the 
Russian government discover that the food market and the agricultural production sector 
reacted differently to the new economic environment. While food product markets adopted 
price liberalization relatively quickly, the agricultural sector has not been able to respond to 
the challenge of the reform. A product of several decades of a centrally planned economy, the 
agricultural production and distribution systems failed to adapt to the new economic 
conditions. Considering that one third of the Russian population resides in rural areas and 
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that agricultural enterprises are major employers of the labor force, the Russian government 
tried to implement a set of programs to create conditions fo r a gradual transfo rmation of the 
structure of agriculture to a that of a market economy. 
It is important to consider these circumstances in order to draw accurate conclusions 
from the analysis of agricultural programs. In most cases, the intent of government 
interventio n was not to distort the markets but to fix market failures . Furthermore, a major 
human element was involved in the process of creating and implementing agricultural policy. 
Governmental officials, scientists, and specialists involved in this process were products of 
the previous system. They are accustomed to thinkjng about agriculture in nonmarket terms. 
Most of them believed and still believe that without government intervention the entire 
agricultural region and branches of production will die, jeopardizing not only the incomes of 
local populations but national food security. 
The purpose of this analysis is to better understand selected agricultural programs by 
usmg market economy theory. In reality, the agricultural sector operates in a econorruc 
environment with a number of features typical of a market-oriented economy and market 
failures . Trus analysis will emphasize the analysis of incentives fo r the government and 
agricultural producers. Also, the analysis will po int to important problems and the results of 
government interventions for Russian agriculture. 
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3.2 S tructure of agricultural policy and the agricultural budget 
The agricultural policy of the Russian government in the first half of the 1990s can be 
interpreted as having had two directions. The first is a strategic, long-term policy that 
targeted deep restructuring of the food market, the agricultural sector and industries that 
provide inputs and process agricultural commodities. In this policy directio~ the government 
denationalized land and liberalized retail and wholesale prices, implemented legal and 
economic conditions for the creation of private farms, launched privatization and the 
restructuring of large agricultural enterprises (former sovkhozes and kolkhozes), and 
eliminated the state monopoly over domestic and foreign trade of agricultural products . 
This long-term agricultural policy was first adopted in 1990 as a part of a program of 
agrarian reform. After 1990, this program was modified almost every year. Sometimes there 
were two o r even three new programs named "the program of agrarian reform." These 
programs were developed by different groups of specialist s with different views on how the 
reform should progress. In reality, the federal government did not implement these programs. 
Usually regional governments adopted their own programs of agrarian reform and that did not 
differ significantly from the federal program. The most recent version of the federal program 
of agrarian reform was adopted in 1994. 
This program points out a few majo r reasons for establishing governmental support 
of agriculture: 
- unstable technological and institutional relationships; 
- absence of government control on prices and wages; 
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- inflation and the growing cost of credit; 
- the budget deficit and a reduction in governmental financing; 
- a reduction of the purchasing power of consumers; 
- an increase in arrears between producers; 
- uncompetitiveness of agricultural products on international markets; and 
- a lack oflegal support ("The Program of Agrarian Reform in the Russian Federation 
in 1994-1 995"). 
The program established the general goal of agrarian reform in Russia "to provide 
food and agricultural products with publicly acceptable prices on the basis of creating 
institutional, economical and financial conditions for efficient functioning of the agro-industrial 
complex, the creation of an agrarian market, social recovery in rural areas, and the 
establishment of ecological equilibrium." ("The Program of Agrarian Reform in the Russian 
Federation in 1994-1995"). 
The second direction of Russian agricultural policy involves short-term or sometimes 
crisis-driven programs to prevent negative developments, from the government's point of 
view, in the agricultural sector and in the food market. These programs include price support 
and "minimum guaranteed prices," input subsidies, preferent ial credits, commodity credit, 
debt write-off, interest rate subsidies, state orders, import tariffs, capital investment, and 
others. These policies have been introduced in the form of government decrees that have been 
adopted each year. The analysis of these programs illustrates the influence of governmental 
practices in a centrally planned economy. For example, these programs established the 
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provision of a certain level of production of major agricultural commodities, as an important 
state task. However, these targets were not obligatory for agricultural producers. Usually 
these decrees proclaimed the main directions of governmental policy for the year. In 
particularly, they stipulated the amount of financial support of agriculture. During the year 
the government issued detailed documents to facilitate the actual fund transfer to the 
agricultural sector. 
It is a complex task to determine all government expenditures connected with 
agriculture. There are four types of associated problems. First, not only the federal 
government but the regional governments had budget expenditures for agriculture, and 
information on regional activities is not complete. Second, the government sometimes 
delayed payment of subsidies and other financial transfers. Thus, the actual amount 
transferred was not the same as that allocated in the budget. Third, some expenditures, such 
as write-offs, were not included in the budget for a specific year but were reflected in an 
increased state debt. Fourth, some programs, such as commodity credits, involved deferment 
of budget revenue, meaning that budget transfers to agriculture were not from the expense 
side of the budget but from the revenue side. 
Selected expenditures associated with the agricultural sector can be described using 
available information. Direct transfers to agriculture were 7 percent of the federal budget in 
1993 and 9 percent in 1994. In 1995, the share is expected to be at a significantly lower level, 
about 4 percent. (Review of Agricultural Policy, Market and Trade Development in Russia in 
1995, p.7.) The largest portion ofthe budget spending consists of subsidies to agricultural 
33 
Table 3.1 Agricultural budget of the Russian Federation, 1994 and 1995 
(billion rubles) 
1994 1995 
(projected) 
Ministry of Agriculture, total expenses 6,466 5,266 
- state support to all agricultural producers 4,283 3,127 
- state support to animal producers 207 176 
- state support to crop producers 782 600 
- education 460 516 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of Russia 
Table 3 .2 The structure of subsidies for the agriculture and food sector from the federal 
budget, 1992 through l 995 (billion rubles) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
(projected) 
Subsidies for livestock production 163 * * * 
Subsidies for pedigree livestock 39 208 280 
Compensation for elite seeds 5 52 100 
Fertilizers and chemical subsidies 120 350 981 
Fuel subsidies for greenhouses 16 50 100 
Subsidies for wool production 150 374 
Feed subsidies 290 150 700 
Other 70 153 183 246 
TOTAL 233 623 1143 2781 
* - transferred to local budgets 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of Russia 
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producers, accounting for 66 percent (see Table 3.1). 
The structure of federal subsidies to agriculture has been changing over time. In 1992, 
major resources were allocated to support prices for animal production and to compensate for 
expenditures associated with fuel and lubricants. In 1993 and 1994 the federal budget 
subsidized mainly pedigree animal production, ferti li zer and chemical expenditures, and 
purchases of concentrated feed for large animal complexes and fo r regions hurt by the drought 
(Table 3.2). 
In addition to subsidies, major federal spending in 1993 and 1994 included interest 
rate compensation. In 1995, "trade credit," debt write-offs, and compensation for the cost of 
machinery were the most expensive programs. On the regional level, the support of animal 
production was the main budget expenditure for agriculture. 
3.3 Price support programs 
3.3. 1 Output-linked subsidies to animal producers 
Subsidies to animal producers were introduced in March 1992 . Initially they were 
paid by the federal government, but in 1993 the program was canceled. However, most of 
the regio nal governments introduced their own programs to support animal production. In 
1994, local budgets paid 2,060 billion rubles1 in subsidies fo r animal products to large 
agricultural enterprises - 55 percent of total subsidies fo r Russian agriculture (Kholod L.). 
1 
Annual average exchange rate: 1992 - 205 ruble/USD, 1993 - 962 ruble/USD, 
1994 - 2276 ruble/USD 
35 
The levels of subsidies and the procedures for distributing them have varied from region to 
region and have been dependent on local factors not connected with agriculture. The process 
of subsidizing agriculture has depended on the performance of industry in the region, the level 
of influence of agricultural authorities in a local government, and the level of general federal 
subsidies (subventions) for the region. Thus, the subsid izing of agriculture has been conducted 
to a large extent without guidance from the federal government and without a uniform 
approach. The result has been that the establishment of independent regional policies 
constrained the development of national trade of agricultural commodities. The same market-
defeating process was repeated in 1993 . Procurement prices for animals have been depressed 
because of output-based subsidies, a concentrated processing sector , and the price-taking 
behavior of agricultural producers 
There were two opportunities for agricultural producers to sell animal products: 
through market channels and through government procurement. However, subsidies were paid 
only for products sold through government procurement. An agricultural producer was 
Table 3 .3 Subsidies for anjmal production from 
federal and local budgets (bin. rubles) 
1993 1994 
Cattle and poultry 431 890 
Milk 404 935 
Eggs 78 160 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of Russia 
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entitled to receive a fixed payment per unit of a product. The structure of animal production 
subsidies is presented in Table 3 .3. (Detailed infonnation on subsidies for the animal sector is 
presented in Appendix A, Table A.6, p. 103) 
Subsidies for animal production were introduced because the federal and local 
governments shared the common belief with producers that animal production could not 
operate under new price relations for inputs and outputs. Due to increasingly higher prices 
for inputs, relative prices for animal products decreased. The current structure of production 
was created with an other set of relative prices. Most enterprises discovered that their 
production structures could not operate efficiently with new relative prices. 
This situation is depicted in Figure 3 . 1. Assume that agricultural enterprises are price 
takers. For each farm there is a perfectly elastic demand. In Figure 3 .1, demand is 
represented by a horizontal line. When the relative price for a product decreases from P to P', 
production on farm 1 (with supply curve S 1) and fann 2 (with supply curve S2) becomes 
unprofitable: their supply curves do not intersect with the demand curve at all. With the new 
price for the product, farm 3 (supply curve S3) would produce significantly less . 
In reality, almost all large animal complexes have experienced this kind of "market 
dilemma. 11 However, smaller and more flexible agricultural producers have been able to 
restructure production and marketing to meet the demand for animal products under the new 
economic conditions. 
It was assumed that the subsidies would increase agricultural producer incentive prices 
and, in turn, income, taking into consideration the given demand in final consumption. 
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Figure 3 .2 The effect of subsidies on industry supply and pnces 
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However, in practice, the subsidies did not work this way, and, according to economic 
theory, could not work. 
Because all large agricultural producers were eligible to receive subsidies, government 
intervention stimulated the shift of industry supply (see Figure 3.2). In this case, the industry 
supply curve faces the down-sloping aggregate demand curve (D). The downward shift in 
supply causes both a production increase and a price drop. If the demand is inelastic in this 
range, which is typical for animal products, the overall effect will be negative for producers, 
because the price drop is greater when production increases. 
The situation described is for agricultural producers operating in competitive 
markets. However, there is another situation, common in Russia, in which farms face a 
processor with downward sloping demand for animals. During the previous period of 
economic development, it was assumed that a high level of concentration in the food industry 
would allow for more efficient production. For this reason, large agricultural producers 
sometimes have just one processor available in their vicinity. 
Consider a typical case for Russia, when a large agricultural enterprise sells cattle to a 
processor (see Figure 3 .3). At various times, the processor has a specific demanded quantity 
for the input D (live cattle) at a given price. The desire to receive immediate return from 
subsidies drives agricultural producers to significantly increase the supply of raw agricultural 
products to processors, causing the supply curve to shift from SO to S 1. Accordingly, a 
wholesale price for raw agricultural product falls from WO to WI . The greater the subsidy, 
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Figure 3 . 3 The effect of subsidies on an animal producer facing a processor's demand 
the greater the shift of the supply curve, in tum, the greater the shift of supply curve, the 
greater the fall in the procurement price. The price difference (WO-WI) is gained by the 
processor. Agricultural producers will lose unless the per unit subsidy is higher than the price 
difference. 
During March and April 1992, after the government announced the introduction of 
subsidies, the average procurement price fo r animals decreased from 20.75 to 16.56 rubles 
per kilogram (Price Handbook ... 1992, p.4)2. In real terms (Consumer Price Index (CPD 
change for these two months equaled 1.59), the price declined by 79 percent. During the 
same period, retail prices for meat fell by only 54 percent. Therefore, relative to retail prices, 
2 Unfortunately, the Russian Statistical Committee combines the wholesale procurement 
prices fo r cattle, hogs, and poultry into one figure. 
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wholesale prices for animals declined by 46 percent. The subsidy for all animals was 
approximately 30 percent of the wholesale price. In other words, due to government 
intervention, agricultural producers lost 16 percent of per unit revenue for animals 
compared to the period before intervention. 
If these assumptions are correct, processors receive all these subsidies plus additional 
gain from the increased margin between farrngate and retail prices. Therefore, in both 
situations the policy of subsidizing animal production leads to a price decrease for agricu ltural 
producers and may cause the decrease of total revenue. The approach that would best serve 
producer interests would be to correct the market failure due to market power in the 
processing sector. 
3.3 .2 Minimum guaranteed prices 
During the period of 1994-1995, the agrarian lobby in the Russian parliament tried 
several times to introduce "m.inimum guaranteed prices" for agricultural producers. However, 
this program was not enforced by the federal government, because after a long period of 
discussions and approval, these proposed m.inimum prices in most cases were below market 
pnces. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the consequences of this type of policy. Using 
the supply and demand framework, it can be shown that a minimum guaranteed price has dual 
results (see Figure 3.4). First, higher prices stimulate producers to increase output of 
agricultural products. The excessive quantity of food products on markets, compared with an 
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equilibrium level, causes prices to fall. Consumers' benefits in these markets can be 
significant, depending on the elasticity of demand. A more inelastic demand results in a greater 
decrease in price. In effect, government spending for the program would not be the product of 
(Pm- PO) and QO (which is how some politicians would present it) but the product of (Pm-
PO) and Q 1. The magnitude of the last value depends on the elasticity of demand and supply. 
A high level of inelasticity of demand and a high level of elasticity of supply wou ld result in 
extremely high government spending to maintain such a program. The reverse effect of the 
program can be a significant increase of taxes that will depress consumer demand and the 
production of other commodities. 
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3.4 Input subsidy programs 
3 .4. l Direct input subsidies 
Partial compensation fo r input expenditures has been another major governmental 
program to support the agricultural sector. In accordance with this program, agricultural 
producers receive compensation for inputs used to produce commodities to be sold to the 
government. 
Again, one should note that in reality a so-called "government purchase" means the 
amount of products sold through officially controlled channels, for instance, processors or 
consumer cooperatives. These are the only channels where the government can control the 
quantity of commodities for which input subsidies are paid. Therefore, the expenditures 
connected with production of commodities sold through other markets (city markets, to other 
agricultural producers, etc.) cannot be compensated. The related regulations during the period 
1992-95 have allowed for the fo llowing compensation: 
- 50% of fuel fo r greenhouses; 
- 30% of fertilizer and pesticides; 
- up to 10% for concentrated feed (Decree #240, 1995); 
- fixed compensation per unit fo r the purchase of pedigree animals; 
- fixed payment per standard animal unit fo r farms producing pedigree 
animal. 
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Table 3 .4 Agricultural input subsidies, 1995 (billion rubles) 
1995 Share of total, % 
Pedigree animal 280 12 
Seeds 100 4 
Fertilizer and pesticides 490 21 
Power supply and fuel 100 4 
Co ncentrated feed 700 31 
Other 62 1 27 
TOT AL subsidies 2,29 1 100 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of Russia 
Input subsidies have occupied a significant share of to tal subsidies for the ag ricultural 
sector (see Table 3.4). These programs can be considered as weU as measures to support 
o ther industries that have been affected by a severe reduction in demand of all inputs by 
agricultural producers. However, the introduction of input subsidies has had self-defeating 
results . After the announcement of the policy to subsidize inputs, all producers of inputs for 
agriculture sharply increased their prices. 
This can be explained by the fact that the supply o f agricultural inputs is relatively 
inelastic, and that the input supply sector has a significant local mo nopoly power. Figure 3.5 
shows that input subsidies cause an upward shift in the input demand. H owever, due to an 
inelastic supply the prices may increase faster than the vo lume of use. 
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There are some objective reasons why input supply is inelastic. In the early 1990s, 
domestic prices were lower than world prices, and imports could not compete in domestic 
markets. Input suppliers, in general, were monopolists in the production of specific inputs 
(eg., two companies produced grain harvesters, three companies produced tractors). 
Sometimes, they are also monopsonists in providing employment for workers in regions in 
which the plants are located. Because their output is not perishable, they can accumulate 
inventories. For instance, mineral fertilizer production has an inelastic supply on the domestic 
market, but it can be exported in large quantities. As monopolists, producers can always 
compensate for reduced demand by raising prices. At some point, demand limitations will 
restrict further price increases. 
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In a competitive market environment it would be reasonable to assume that, in order 
to increase production of the input, producers would restructure and lower costs, and then 
bring input prices down. However, in reality, some input producers have simply gone out of 
business, causing significant growth in local unemployment (for example, most fertilizer 
producers have simply cut production or shut down their plants). Others have pressured the 
federal and local governments for direct financial support to prevent the shutdown of plants 
and further unemployment (for example, the grain harvester producers in Rostov-na-Donu and 
Krasnoyarsk). 
The one reason for the implementation of the input subsidy policy was to release the 
burden of price scissors (price disparity) between resource costs and output prices for 
agriculture. However, completely opposite results have been achieved: price disparity has 
increased significantly. In order to estimate the changes in price disparity between agricultural 
inputs and products, the output price-input cost ratio has been calculated for grain (Table 
3.5). 
As shown in Table 3 .5, after price liberalization beginning in 1992, the price disparity 
decreased. This change was favorable to agricultural producers, because they had to seU fewer 
units of output to buy a unit of input. After introduction of the input subsidy policy, the 
output price-input cost ratio increased. In the second half of 1992, it became greater than 
before government intervention. In 1993, when this intervention was continued, the price 
disparity became even greater. 
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Table 3 . 5 The output price-input cost ratio for grain, 1991 through 1993 
(tons per unit of input) 
1991 1992 1993 
first half second half 
Grain harvester 44 38 54 87 
Tractor 35 31 37 56 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of Russia and K.iselev S. 
3.4.2 Indirect input subsidies in the form of "leasing programs" 
In 1994, the federal government introduced a new policy to support demand for 
inputs for agricultural producers; the so-called "leasing program" was launched. Prior to the 
adoption of this program, input subsidies were received by producers directly. In accordance 
with the new program, the government chose one organization, ROSAGROSNAB, which 
ordered inputs from suppliers and distributed them to regional authorities in return for 
contracts for long-term repayment (with subsidized interest rates) . The list of supplies was 
determined by the Ministry of Agriculture and the agricultural departments of the regional 
administrations. This program called for the restoration of a distribution system resembling 
that of the former centrally planned economy. 
This situation is another example of a government attempt to fix a market failure: the 
supply curve of a producer of agricultural machinery and equipment derived from its 
production function does not intersect with the demand curve derived from production 
function of an agricultural producer. As a result, large agricultural producers created to 
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operate with a significant number of tractors, combines, planters, etc., have practically 
stopped purchasing new machinery. However, without this equipment they cannot exist for 
long as producing units . By introducing the "leasing" programs the federal government tried 
to "warm up" the market for agricultural equipment. 
In effect, the program did not eliminate price disparity but instead accelerated this 
process. ROSAGROSN AB, using monopoly power, increased input prices by 10 to 40 
percent. Moreover, the opportunity to distribute resources by bureaucratic methods has 
created some sources fo r corruption, and as well led to a political rather than an economic 
basis for resource allocation. Thus, the input subsidy program has not solved the financ1al 
problems of agriculture. To some extent, it has only deepened the financial crisis in agriculture 
through stimulating increased price dispari ty. 
3.5 Agricultural credit 
During this transition period the federal government and local authorities have used 
several methods to establish a credit system fo r agricultural production: preferential loans, 
trade credit and investment credit. The reasons fo r introducing these credit policies were the 
same as that fo r animal output subsidies and the subsidies fo r agricultural inputs. In the new 
economy, agricultural producers found that they were unable to obtain and pay off loans that 
were supplied by a quickly reorganized financial system. 
The problem with malcing loans for agricultural producers is recognized in all 
countries and is caused by the nature of agricultural production. Most developed countries 
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have created agricultural credit systems to provide loans with lower interest rates for 
agricultural producers. The Russian federal government has also been trying to create a credit 
system to provide loans with acceptable interest rates for agricultural producers. Here the 
problem is linked to the weakness of reform in the asset market. To borrow at a reasonable 
interest rate and fo r an appropriate period, agricultural producers must have equity, which 
will not be available without more complete privatization. 
3. 5. 1 Preferential credit 
Price liberalization and tight macroeconomic policy increased interest rates fo r loans. 
Agricultural producers, accustomed to credit resources from the federal budget with low 
interest rates, were unprepared fo r this increase. The first shock was the complete 
unavailability of the long-term loans that are necessary financial resources fo r agriculture, an 
industry with a long production cycle. During this period, commercial banks preferred to 
provide short-term loans, eg., l to 3 months in the absence of collateral for securi ty. The 
second shock was the high interest rates, which limited investment in the current system. 
In 1992, the federal government responded to the issue by allocating low-interest 
centralized credit fo r agricultural producers. In the beginning, a differential rate was applied: 
28 percent for large agricultural enterpri ses and 8 percent for private (peasant) farms . At the 
same time, the average interest rate in the economy was about 100 percent. In 1993, the 
government introduced a uniform preferential credit fo r all agricultural producers with a 28 
percent interest rate. By contrast to the Central Bank rate for refinancing was 180 to 230 
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percent. 
To understand the results of this policy it is necessary to discuss what kind of 
incentives it provides. Credit resources with preferential interest rates require rationing. The 
federal government establishes limits fo r the regions, and the regional governments have the 
authority to distribute these financial resources among the agricultural producers. For this 
reason, the quantity of loans available to an agricultural enterprise is defined by a "good 
relationship" with local authorities and the bank responsible for providing loans, rather than 
the efficiency of the farm. Also, regional governments use the control over credit resources 
to establish specific conditions for marketing agricultural products within their respective 
regions. In exchange for low-interest loans, agricultural enterp ri ses are sometimes obLigaced 
to sell preliminarily defined portions of their marketed products to the local government fo r 
so-called "regional food funds. 11 These funds are, then, in fact, used as instruments to support 
low prices for most important foodstuffs i.n the regional retail markets. 
Bureaucratic control over credit resources is a well-known method of suppo rting 
product ion inherited from the centrally planned economy. Modem government officials favor 
this approach because it allows them to recover the influence over producers that was lost 
during the economic reforms. Also, this system stimulates corruption and inefficient 
allocation of budget resources. 
Compared with commercial loans, preferential credits together with rationing may 
provide perverse incentives fo r producers. Commercial loans fo rce agricultural producers to 
compete with other sectors of the economy for financial resources. In general, thi s strategy 
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stimulates the intensive restructuring of production and marketing that, in tum, creates 
conditions for the growth of efficiency in the framework of the new economic environment. 
To carry out restructuring and new marketing tactics require significant changes in 
personal behavior not only for farm managers but fo r ordinary workers as well. The process 
of eliminating habits and customs based on a centrally planned economy and learning to 
become efficient under new economic conditions can be painful and contradictory. Whether 
or not it is the existing attitudes or the poorly functioning asset markets that limit the 
restructuring is a still unanswered question. 
On the other hand, "hunting" for preferential credits does not require changes in the 
production and marketing structure. Neither does it demand agricultural managers to change 
their personal behavior. Agricultural managers are accustomed to dealing with local 
authorities to obtain limited resources. Another important characteristic of this system is that 
it supports the existence of large agricultural enterprises and only partly supports the 
emerging private (peasant) farms. Private subsidiary farms are not eligible to receive loans 
with low interest rates . Thus, the system of preferential credits helps large agricultural 
enterprises to survive but it does not encourage managers to adapt to new approaches to 
management. 
Moreover, due to a lack of control in procedures for the distribution of agricultural 
credits, these funds were widely used by both local authorities and agricultural producers for 
purposes other than agricultural production. The typical situation was that some commercial 
firms and banks proposed to managers of agricultural enterprises to invest their money in 
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higher profit activities or simply to deposit the money in a high interest account. Of course, 
by accepting these proposals the managers were personally rewarded, but in most of cases the 
money never reached agricultural production. It should be noted that in the absence of strict 
loan procedures, in a market economy subsidized financial resources will go to businesses 
with higher opportunity costs. The above-mentioned situation with preferential credits 
indicates that agricultural managers responded to the market without any problem as long as 
they had the opportunity to use budget money. However, when they discuss agriculture, the 
typical argument is still the same: Russian agriculture it is not ready for a market economy 
and agricultural producers need government investment to restructure agricultural enterprises. 
The federal government eliminated preferential credits for agriculture in the fall of 
1993 . However, in many regions, local authorities introduced their own programs to provide 
noncommercial loans to the LAEs and processing enterprises. Therefo re, the changed federaJ 
government policy has not altered producer behavior in general. 
3.5.2 Write-offs as fo rms of direct subsidy 
The write-off and extension of repayment of their debts by agricultural producers 
has become a serious problem for the Russian banking system, which now operates in a 
highly competitive environment. During the period 1992-93 , the federal government ordered 
the write-off or extended repayment of about 20,000 billion rubles, a value that exceeded 
the agricultural share of gross domestic product (GDP). This government action sharply 
reduced bankers' faith in the integrity of loans to the agricultural sector and also reversed the 
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trend toward financial responsibility among producers. Even such a giant as the former state 
Russian Agro-Industrial Bank (ROSAGROPROMBANK), which traditionally financed the 
agrarian sector, now holds less than half of its portfolio in agricultural loans. 
The write-offs have increased the internal debt, which, as an inflationary factor, once 
again has struck the agricultural sector with its long production cycle. Also, the system of 
unconditional and unselective writing-offs of agricultural debts has not provided LAEs 
incentives to restructure production and marketing. In fact, just the opposite is the case. This 
policy has distorted the market of commercial credit. Having the knowledge that sooner or 
later all debts will be written-off, managers of agricultural enterprises may felt free to take as 
many loans as possible to improve the situation in the short-run and may not have attended to 
the procedures required to pay off these loans. Also, agricultural managers have not tended to 
use these resources entirely for agricultural purposes, having the opportunity to invest m 
other more profitable business activities and to receive personal benefits. 
Two major conclusions can be made about the agricultural credit policy. First, keeping 
in mind the restructuring of large agricultural enterprises and the reform of the entire 
agricultural sector, the federal government, along with regional governments, did not 
introduce a credit policy for agriculture consistent with the market reforms. Second, current 
policies of preferential credits and write-offs do not provide new incentives for agricultural 
producers, thereby maintaining the inefficient structure of the agricultural sector. 
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3.6 Import and export tarifTs 
Strong regulation of foreign trade and the monopoly of the state were features of the 
former Soviet government. The Russian government, which has demonopolized foreign 
trade, inherited the willingness to control this process. There are two major reasons for the 
government to regulate foreign trade: to protect domestic producers, and to raise additional 
revenue for the budget. 
Before the economic reforms, the Soviet government used subsidized imported 
commodities extensively to provide cheaper goods for consumers and resources for 
producers. Prior to 1993 , foreign trade was still controll ed by governmental agencies and the 
Russian government regulated prices for some food products. About 36 commodities, 
including butter, cheese, milk powder, meat products, vegetable oil, sugar and flour were 
subsidized on the domestic market. Imported inputs fo r agricultural producers were also 
heavily subsidized. 
During 1993, due to the demonopolization of foreign trade, subsidies on imported 
commodities were mainly removed and former governmental agencies that dealt with 
international trade were eliminated or reorganized into joint-stock companies. Only about six 
mo nths were required to recognize that importing could provide some food products 
cheaper for consumers than domestic producers, without subsidies. Since the beginning of 
1994 the federal government has experienced significant pressure from the agrarian lobby to 
protect domestic agricultural producers and the food industry from relatively cheap imported 
foodstuffs. 
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At the same time the Russian government realized that there was a tendency to 
increase the export of some agriculturaJ products that have been in shortage on the domestic 
market. Thus, in 1994 the federal government introduced both import and export tariffs for 
selected food commodities. The highest import tariffs have been imposed on wool (30 
percent), sugar (25 percent) and poultry (25 percent) (see Table 3 .6). 
The short-run impact of the introduction of these tariffs can be analyzed using 
standard theory. Consider the imposition of import tariffs because selected imported products 
Table 3.6 Import and export tariffs for selected agricultural commodities, 1995 
Import tariffs Export tariffs 
Wool 30% Wheat, durum 17% 
White sugar 25% Sugar beet 15% 
Poultry 25% Sugar 60 ECU/t 
Butter 20 Com 10% 
Meat and meat products 15% Wheat, other varieties 7% 
(except poultry) 
Milk and dairy products 10-20% 
Oil seeds 5-1 0% 
Vegetable oil 15% 
Fruits 5-10% 
Grain 1% 
Source: The Decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation #454, 6.05.95 and 
#858, 31 .08.95 
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such as sugar, vegetable oil, poultry occupied significant parts of domestic market while 
agricultural export was not crucial . 
Assume that the domestic supply and demand for a specific product clear the market 
with a higher price than the world price for the product. The world price is considered 
perfectly elastic in the shortrun. This situatio n is depicted in Figure 3 .6. After the 
introduction of an impo rt tariff, the domestic price becomes higher and moves from Pw to Pt 
on the graph. Compared with the situation before the introduction of the tariff, domestic 
producers will be able to sell more of this commodity (Qt instead Qw) and will receive a 
higher price. At the same time, consumers will face a higher price and will accordingly reduce 
D 
s 
Pt 
Pw t--~~~~-7"<--~~~~~~.:i....-~ ~ 
Qw Qt Ft Fw 
Figure 3 . 6 The effect of import tariff 
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consumption from Fw to Ft. The government as well as the producers gain. Import duties 
measured as a product of (Ft-Qt) and Pt go to the budget. 
The results of the introduction of an effective import tariff are straightforward: 
domestic producers and the government gain while consumers lose. For this reason, the 
policy has been heavily criticized by the authorities of the large cities that have been the main 
consumers of imported foodstuffs . During 1994 there was a serious struggle between two 
influential fo rces in policy making: the agrarian lobby and leaders of large cities represented 
mainly by the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg. After some delay, the federal 
government .introduced reduced rates for import tariffs . However, in the middle of 1995, 
import tariffs were again increased. The average tariff for agricultural products rose from 13 
to 15 percent. Import duties were also expanded on the entire list of imported food products. 
Despite the obvious losses for consumers, the federal government has decided that 
support of domestic producers and additional budget revenues are preferable to lower prices 
on domestic food markets, especially in the major cities. 
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CHAPTER 4. EVALUATION OF SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURE 
4.1 Review of previous works 
The analysis of agricultural policy often includes the estimation of its overall effect on 
the performance of domestic agriculture. The best known and internationally adopted method 
to appraise the effect of all policy instruments is the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE). 
Recently this lcind of analysis was conducted for Russian agriculture (Liefert, et al.). The 
general conclusion was that "the estimated values are highly negative, indicating that Russian 
agriculture has been heavily taxed." The authors state that this result derives from the 
fo llowing facto rs: "First, government trade and price policies, at the regional as well as the 
federal level, have operated to keep domestic producer prices below world prices. Second, the 
deficient Russian physical and institutional infrastructure has resulted in high domestic 
transaction costs for Russian agricultural output. To compete with goods on the world 
market, Russian producers must bear all the costs of getting their output to final users. These 
high transactions costs in an economic sense also tax domestic production" (Liefert, et al, 
p .2) . The final results of this analysis are presented in Table 4 .1. 
However, the conclusion and supporting arguments, together with the data chosen for 
these calculatio ns, raise some doubts and concerns about the consistency of th.is analysis and 
the conclusions. In order to make these concerns more clear we need to analyze in more detail 
both the principles of the PSE approach and the specific features of the agricultural structure 
and markets in Russia. 
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Table 4 .1 Estimates of PSEs fo r Russian agriculture, l 992 through 1994 
(percentage per unit value) 
1992 1993 1994 
Beef -11 62 -449 -363 
Pork -680 - 175 -1 36 
Poultry -432 -58 -3 l 
Milk -918 -467 -3 10 
Eggs -635 -209 -79 
Wheat -399 -292 -341 
Com -120 -1 03 -24 
Barley -277 -187 -304 
Sugar beets -482 -184 -108 
Sunflower seeds - 164 -322 -1 73 
Source: Derived from Liefert, et al., pp.13-14 
4.2 T he concept of PSE 
The PSE method was initially developed by Professor Tim Josling for the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the UN (F AO) in the early 1970s (Cahil, Legg). It was adopted 
by Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in implementing the 
1982 Ministerial Trade Mandate. PS Es were initially calculated fo r a set of OECD countries 
consisting of Austria, Australia, Canada, the European Economic Commonwealth (EEC), 
Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. The purpose of calculating PSEs was to provide 
in a single, all-inclusive measure, the transfers to the agricultural sector from the rest of the 
economy arising from government policies. 
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For each product, the PSE for a gjven category of support represents the value to 
agricultural producers of the transfers from consumers or the government due to the support 
at the existing level of production. PSEs are calculated at the farmgate level. The prices 
received by farmers are the prices paid by consumers at the first level of consumption. Under 
these conditions, the consumption price at the farm gate is the producer price, except when 
the level of consumption is higher than the level of production and the level of market support 
of the quantities imported is different from that of domestic production. 
The P SE is an indicator of the value of the transfers from domestic consumers and 
taxpayers to producers resulting from a given set of agricultural policies at a point in time. 
Thus, PSEs are aggregate measures of the total monetary value o f the assistance to output 
and inputs on a commodity-by-commodity basis, associated with government policies. 
Five categories of agricultural policy measures are included in the OECD calculations 
ofPSEs: 
i) Measures that simultaneously affect producer and consumer prices (market 
price support); 
ii) Measures that transfer money directly to producers without raising prices to 
consumers (direct payment); 
iii) Measures that lower input costs (reduction in input costs); 
iv) Measures that in the long term reduce costs but that are not directly received by 
producers (general services). 
PSEs can be expressed in three ways: i) as the total value of transfers for the 
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commodity produced; ii) the total value of transfers per unit of the commodity produced; and 
iii) as the total value of transfers as a percentage of the total value of production including 
transfers. 
In algebraic form, where the level of production is QP, the domestic market price is Pd• 
the world price is PW> direct payments are D, levies on producers are L and all other budgetary 
financed support is B, the PSE expressions as measured by OECD are (Cahi l C., Legg W. p. 
16): 
Total PSE = QP(P d - P w) + D - L + B 
Unit PSE = Total PSE/Qp 
Percentage PSE = 100 (Total PSE)/ [QP Pd + D - L] (at domestic prices). 
4.3 Discussion of the assumptions in PSE calculations 
There are some important underlying assumptions used in the calculation of PSEs: 
i) Markets of agricultural commodities have downward-sloping demand and upward-
sloping supply curves that determine equilibrium prices and producer and 
consumer surpluses, meaning the "law of one price" applies; 
ii) An open small-country economy is assumed, in which prices in the world market 
are assumed to express the opportunity costs to domestic producers and consumers; 
iii) Commodities are assumed to be homogeneous fo r producers and consumers. This 
applies both to the commodities defined for reference (world) price purposes and 
domestic commodities. 
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This list shows that if the main purpose of the calculation of P SEs is taken into 
consideration, the methods used by Liefert et al. are not consistent with the purpose, because 
some of the assumptions are seriously vio lated. It will be also shown that more accuracy is 
required when one operates with statistical data on Russian agricultural production and sales. 
With improved data, it is possible to generate significantly different results, even in the 
framework of standard PSE methodology. 
It is useful to mention that o riginally the PSE method was applied to countries with 
developed market economies. All of them are well-integrated into the world agricultural and 
nonagricultural markets . For this reason, the applicability of this method to countries with 
economies in transition to a market economy and a low level of integration in international 
markets can be limited. For each country, different limitations may apply. Furthermore, some 
restrictio ns that make the use of the PSE method for Russian agriculture questionable should 
be considered. 
4 .3 . 1 The first assumption 
The "law of one price" is not applicable in most transition economies, though the 
degree of market integration varies considerably. It is particularly no t acceptable fo r Russian 
agriculture for several reaso ns. 
First, the degree of market integration varies greatly among Russian agricultural 
producers. At present, there are three forms of agricultural enterprises in Russia. One 
group consists of 25,000 large agricultural enterprises. In 1994 , they produced about (i() 
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percent of agricultural output. Approximately 38 percent of output was produced by 
private subsidiary farms consisting of 16.5 million households. About 2 percent of output 
was produced by emerged new private farms (peasant farms). During the transition 
period one can observe the significant changes in the structure of agricultural production 
(see Chapter 2) . Each of these groups has its own specific production and market 
characteristics, and faces very different input and product market conditions. Liefert et al. 
analyze the entire agricultural sector without distinguishing the difference among various 
groups of producers. 
Because these groups of producers have different structures and sales channels, they 
face different prices. For example, most meat produced by large agricultural enterprises is 
sold to local meat processors. Owners of PSFs prefer to sell their products on local public 
retail markets (bazaars). As a result , in one case the agricultural producers receive the 
procurement price less the processing margin and in the other case they receive the retail 
price and internalize the processing and market costs. By virtue of the fact that both 
channels of sales have significant shares of the meat market, we cannot consider only one 
price as a reference price for the domestic meat market. Liefert et al. apply only the 
wholesale price for all agricultural commodities. This approach could substantially 
understate the revenue for agricultural producers depending on the type of commodity. 
The structure of sales for each agricultural commodity varies. For example, bulk grain is 
sold on the wholesale market to processors or other enterprises. At the same time, most 
potatoes are marketed to consumers through local retail markets. 
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Taking these factors into consideration, a researcher needs to distinguish groups of 
producers and different commodity markets in order to obtain the correct information about 
prices and revenues in agriculture to be used in PSE calculations. 
4.3.2 The second assumption 
Russian agriculture does not operate in the framework of an open country economy 
for all agricultural commodities. There are only few commodities for which one can apply 
this approach: eg., sugar, butter, poultry and vegetable oil. Russian agricultural 
producers work under the condition of closed isolated markets for most other 
commodities. As a result, only domestically originated demand and supply clear the 
market. The prices on the world agricultural markets do not significantly affect domestic 
prices. Thus, they do not represent the opportunity cost for Russian agricultural 
producers. 
This situation exists for several reasons. The fust reason is a difference in the 
quality of commodities. Most agricultural producers and food processors do not provide 
the quality of products required for international markets. The second reason is the lack 
of knowledge of international markets. And the third reason is an insufficient market 
infrastructure to transfer signals from world markets to domestic producers. Also, the 
experience of many Russian businessmen shows that federal or local regulations not be 
considered as significant obstacles to the export of food products from Russia. However, 
the necessity to meet the quality requirements in other countries is a real challenge. As a 
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result, the export of agricultural and food products occupies an insignificant share in the 
market and cannot be considered at present as a source of revenue for domestic 
agriculture. 
The majority of agricultural outputs can only be sold on domestic markets and in 
most cases only on local or regional markets. Therefore, one should be careful in 
determining a reference price that may represent the opportunity cost for domestic 
producers. In very rare cases, it will be world prices (for example, in recent years a small 
amount of barley, wheat and flour was traded with other countries) . However, the small 
volume of this trade indicates that these markets are not available to most producers. 
Therefore, these prices cannot be considered as the opportunity costs for the entire 
agricultural sector. In some cases (for example, grains) , average national prices can 
represent the opportunity costs for many agricultural producers . However, for some other 
agricultural products only local or regional prices are realistic market information for 
agricultural producers. Only the level of these prices determines producer's revenue for a 
particular commodity. The bulk of agricultural products (especially the high-value ones) 
falls into that category, including meat, milk, eggs, and potatoes. 
The use of import prices as reference prices is also inappropriate for other reasons. 
These are connected with the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of commodities 
and is discussed in detail below. 
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4.3.3 The third assumption 
The violation of the third assumption can be considered in the framework of 
arguments that were applied to explain the violation of the second assumption. Liefert et 
al. use some world prices as the reference prices for domestic production. However, they 
do not explain how they justify the compatibility of these prices with prices for 
domestically produced agricultural commodities. 
In some cases Liefert et al. use the price for one kind of commodity as a reference 
price for another. For example, fo r wheat they used the price that represents food wheat with 
high quality characteristics (protein, milling quality, etc.). At the same time, the chosen 
domestic price is the average wheat price including food and feed categories. In the case of 
poultry, the reference price relates mostly to the import of chicken legs. However, the 
domestic price relates to the whole chicken carcass. Therefore, the assumption of 
homogeneity of commodities is violated. 
Further, there are some concerns about the use of so-called "world prices" for 
agricultural commodities such as sugarbeets, milk and eggs. These commodities are raw 
agricultural products that are generally not traded intemationaLiy. If the authors use prices 
from other countries, it means that they violate the second assumption because these markets 
are not available for Russian agricultural producers. 
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4. 3. 4 The exchange rate 
The previous arguments have cast some doubt on the acceptability of the PSE 
methodology to estimate the overall transfer to or from agricultural producers. However, it is 
also necessary to mention the problems connected with the choice of the exchange rate in 
these calculations. 
The exchange rate is the price of one currency in terms of another one. In our case, 
this price reflects the equilibrium on the money market that is comprised of dollar demand 
and supply and ruble demand and supply. This market has limited influence o n overall 
agricultural product ion and agricultural trade. Most of the agricultural output is sold on 
domestic markets for rubles, and most inputs are bought in the domestic markets fo r rubles 
from domestic producers who also do not rely on international supply. For this reason, the use 
of the commercial ruble/dollar exchange rate for estimation of transfer to Russian agricultural 
producers is senseless from the point of view of domestic producers. The authors themselves 
demonstrate that the use of another exchange rate (purchasing power parity) would generate 
the opposite result: the PSEs would become positive. In this case, the reasons fo r the 
conclusion that Russian agriculture is heavily taxed disappear immediately. However, the 
authors fo r some reason ignored this result, which ( as will be demonstrated further) is much 
closer to the real situation in Russian agriculture. Moreover, they try to present some outside 
information that, from their point of view, could support the general conclusion obtained with 
the PSE methodology. 
The use of PPP (purchasing power parity) is not considered a correct approach to 
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calculating PSEs. One cannot use use the PPP exchange rate because the purpose of PSE 
calculations is to estimate transfers to or from agricultural producers in real economic terms. 
However, PPP does not exist in the real economy and nobody uses it fo r financial 
transactions. For this reason, the estimations of PSE obtained in the tenns of the PPP 
exchange rate did not serve the initial goal of their study. 
4. 3 . 5 Reference prices 
The correct definition of external reference prices has always been the most 
controversial issue in PSE calculations. Experience has shown that reference prices are the 
most important parameter in determining the magnitude and the trends in PSE. Liefert et al . 
use a practical rule, established by OECD, that an fo .b. (free-on-board) border price is chosen 
if a country is a net exporter while c. i.f. (cost , insurance, freight) price is chosen for a net 
importer (Cahil C., Legg W., p.24). Moreover, the authors apply this rule for all commodities 
assuming that "the appropriate border prices to us in computing PSEs are import c.i.f. prices 
(mainly to Baltic ports)." 
Two arguments can be made against this approach. First, to use a uniform approach 
to calculate PSEs for all chosen commodities may be not correct . In recent OECD studies on 
agricultural policies in transition economies, different prices are used as proxies for 
reference prices. For example, in order to calculate PSEs for the Czech Republic the following 
reference prices are used (Review of Agricultural PoLicies. Czech Republic, p.281 ) : 
- European Union (EU) export price for wheat (fo.b. Rouen), barley (f.o.b. French 
ports), refined sugar (f.o.b. EU); 
- Austrian unit export value for rye; 
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- Czech unit export value for potatoes; 
- EU import price for rapeseed; 
- New Zealand farmgate price for milk; 
- EU live animal price for beef, veal and pigrneat; 
- Extra-EU unit export value for poultry and eggs. 
Second, the estimation of some border prices used in the PSE calculations cause 
concerns. For example, the authors use a reference price for wheat that ranges from 209 
USD to 214 USD per ton for various years. However, this price great ly overstates the actual 
price of wheat imports to Russia. In 1992 and 1993, the average price of imported wheat 
was about 146 USD to 147 USD. Sometimes the price has been even lower because either 
Russia imported subsidized grain from developed countries or the grain was impo rted from 
other countries of the former USSR. For example, in the first quarter of l 995 the average 
price of imported wheat was 85 USD per ton, in the second quarter - 109 USD (Sizov A.). 
The quality characteristics of a commodity should also be taken into consideration. The 
wheat traded on the Chicago Board of Trade has in most cases different quality 
characteristics than the bulk of wheat traded domestically in Russia. For this reason, the so-
called "the world price" cannot always serve as a the best source of reference price for PSE 
calculations. 
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4.4 Discussion of the domestic economic environment and regulation 
Liefert et al. suggest that there are two main reasons for "large negative PSE 
calculations" : state controls on prices and trade and a deficient agricultural infrastructure. 
From their point of view, these factors cause the low fanngate prices. The discussion in the 
previous section shows that we cannot consider world prices as the opportunity costs for 
domestic agricultural producers in Russia. Now, let us examine how the economic 
environment and regulations influence domestic agricultural prices. 
The authors noted that there is no restriction on internal trade from the federal 
government. One can also analyze the federal regulations fo r recent years and conclude that 
the federal government did not have, does not have, and will not have an intention to restrict 
the domestic agricultural trade. However, some interventions exist for foreign trade. The 
federal government imposes significant tariffs on imported food (from 15 to 35 percent) that 
favor domestic agricultural producers. Furthermore, the federal government has several 
programs to support revenue for agricultural producers that increase incentive prices. For this 
reason, federal agricultural policy cannot be considered as the main cause of depressing 
fanngate prices. 
Liefert et al . also speculate that state control, in the fo rms of quotas, licenses, taxes, 
and bans on export, has been stronger at the regional level than at the federal level. However, 
this conclusion can be argued. Based on economic theory one can conclude that the 
restrictions on exports in producing regions cause oversupply in these regions and shortages 
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in net-importing areas. The oversupply causes prices to fall in producing regions, and, at the 
same time, the shortage causes an increase in prices in deficit regions. Sooner or later the 
agricultural products will be moved from exporting regions to importing regions. Thus, both 
effects of the regional export restriction need to be recognized, as well as the possibiljty of 
arbitrage to exploit the price difference that results from these restrictions. 
Another argument that supports the existence of state control on the local level is 
controlling retail prices fo r food commodities. A reference from a Russian source quoted by 
Liefert et al. states that the percentages of cities controlling retail prices at a low level in a 
March 1994 sample are 66 percent fo r bread, 35 percent fo r sugar, 33 fo r meat, and 44 
percent for milk. The authors assume that these restrictions cause lower purchasing prices fo r 
agricultural producers. 
However, the percentage of cities that control retail prices, along with restrictions on 
trade, did not give these researchers correct information about the significance of control on 
the deviation of prices from equilibrium. The authors assume that the implementation of these 
regulations at the local level can be a significant factor that explains the large difference (from 
2 to 10 times) between world prices and domestic prices of agricultural products. In order to 
obtain this kind of information, detailed studies should be conducted. 
Unfortunately, no such studies exjst. However, one can use a study on retail food 
prices in Russia, conducted by Gardener and Brooks. This study shows that regulation at the 
local level explains only a smaJI part of price differences among cities in Russia. Therefore, 
this factor cannot be used to explain the significant deviation of domestic prices from world 
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pnces. 
4.5 Estimation of the JeveJ of support to agriculture 
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned arguments, another calculation of 
PS Es fo r Russian agriculture has been conducted. The results of these calculations and a 
discussion of the approach are presented in this section. The final results of these calculations 
appear in Table 4.2 . The tables upon which calculations of this set of PSEs are based are 
prov1ded in Appendix B . 
In order to provide results that are consistent with the approach in the prev1ous work 
in th.is study the modified formulas 1 are used to calculate PSEs: 
Percentage PSE = Unit PSE/( Pd + T/Q) 
where Pd= weighted market price for all agricultural producers, T = all subsidies and 
transfers to agriculture, Q = production marketed by all agricu ltural producers, P..., = 
reference price in dollars, E = exchange rate rubles per USD. 
In th.is case a PSE is defined as the difference between a commodity "incentive price" 
(market price plus per unit subsidies and transfers) and its reference price (border price from 
the international market). Percentage PSE is measured to incentive price in accordance wi th 
the OECD approach. 
1 These formulas can be easily derived from the formulas on p. 6 1. However, they do not 
include lev1es on producers, which can be ignored because they are inconsequential in 
Russia 
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Table 4 . 2 Alternative estimates of PSEs for Russian agriculture, 
1992 through 1994, (percentage per unit value) 
1992 1993 1994 
Beef and veal -148 -16 14 
Pi gm eat -33 22 42 
Poultry -32 21 38 
Milk -4 3 45 
Eggs -211 30 48 
Wheat -106 -98 -132 
Corn -40 -48 -10 
Barley -274 -88 -90 
Sugar beets 16 25 16 
Sunflower seeds -56 0 5 
Potatoes - 103 -68 64 
Source: calculations by the author (see Appendix B) 
Several modifications have been made to compared to the previous work. First, the 
production marketed has been separated among different groups of agricultural producers. 
Second, the appropriate prices have been applied for each part of the production marketed. 
Wholesale prices have been used for the output marketed by large agricultural producers. 
Retail prices from city markets have been chosen as a proxy for the products marketed by 
private subsidiary farms. Third, different approaches have been applied to choose reference 
prices depending upon the commodity and the situation on the market. 
These calculations generate completely different results compared with the previous 
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study by Liefert et al. Two periods can be distinguished: a period with negative PSEs and a 
period with positive PSEs. The negative PSE estimates mean that agricultural producers 
supply cheaper agricultural products than could be imported from the international market. 
This situation is beneficial for domestic consumers. One cannot interpret the situation as a 
transfer from agricultural producers to consumers or taxation of agriculture. Both sides of 
the food market prefer to operate under these conditions because open markets with the 
current exchange rates would mean extremely high prices and a decrease in consumption 
by consumers and a loss of significant markets for agricultural producers. 
Agricultural producers do not compete on the international market due to the 
difference in quality between domestically produced and internationally traded products. In 
addition, no developed channels for international trade exist. The small volume of 
agricultural exports indicates that only an insignificant number of agricultural producers 
can receive benefit from international trade by taking advantage of substantially lower 
production costs. 
It is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the commercial exchange rate 
for 1992 cannot be used in the conventional way as in other countries. The exchange 
market was very "thin," with a small volume of exchanged currency that was unstable due 
to the high level of inflation and changes in governmental regulations. During this period , 
the level and dynamic of the exchange rate did not reflect fully the domestic economic 
conditions. Like any market, the currency market needed some time to adapt to the new 
economic environment. Before that period, the exchange rate was established only by 
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government. Later, a greater volume of currency became jnvolved in exchanges, and 
imported food products became an important part of overall imports. During the period 
1993-94, the exchange rate began to play a more significant role for food consumption 
and agricultural producers. One can see that market price support became positive in the 
1993-94 period for most of the analyzed products (Table 4 .2). 
It is assumed that the positive value of market price support for agricultural 
producers has three sources: budget transfers , consumer transfers and compensation for 
entrepreneurship. The first two transfers are a common part of PS Es, however the 
transfers connected with entrepreneurship have not been discussed in the previous work. 
Therefore, the following discussion will be focused mainly on this issue. 
The compensation for entrepreneurship is not an independent or additional source 
of money flow for the agricultural producer. Part of consumer transfers goes directly to 
agricultural producers because they sell a part of their output on retail markets . Of course, 
agricultural producers bear some expenditures connected with processing and transporting 
commodities to the consumers. In the case of meat products, they need to slaughter 
livestock and cut carcasses. Some milk is also sold in the form of processed products (sour 
cream, butter, cheese). Experience shows that these expenditures are significantly lower 
than the gap between farmgate and retail prices. 
In previous analyses , it is pointed out that retail prices are were applied only for 
sales by private subsidiary farms. However, it is a well-known fact that large agricultural 
producers also use this channel to receive "hard cash." Usually they do not report correctly 
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about the volume of these sales. In other words, positive PSE in the case of the Russian 
agricultural sector can be partially interpreted as a support of entrepreneurship conducted 
by agricultural producers. 
4.6 Analysis of PSEs by commodity 
4 . 6 .1~ 
The market price for beef for large agricu ltural producers can be found in the annual 
official statistical. handbook. One can also find the annual average price through other 
channels. It is important to note that these sources indicate that almost 80 percent of beef 
sales go through the wholesale market (local meat processors and consumer cooperatives). 
Thus, procurement prices serve as good indicators of market revenue fo r large agricultu ral 
producers. 
T he determination of the market price for private subsidiary farms is a complex task. 
There is no official statistical information about these sales. For this reason, city market prices 
are used as a proxy of the market price for these agricultural producers, because most 
products from PSFs go to consumers through local retail markets. The officially repo rted 
volume of agricultural products sold by private subsidiary farms is underestimated (perhaps 
significantly). For obvious reasons, private farmers do not prefer to report a true volume of 
sales. Therefore, the overall revenue for the agricultural sector from private subsidiary farms 
is consistently understated. H owever, our calculations show that even using the official 
information on these agricultural producers significantly changes the financial performance of 
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the agricultural sector. 
Because Russia imports a significant quantity of beef ( 1992 - 288, 000 tons, 1994-
3 58,000 tons), one can use the average price of imported red meat as a reference price for 
beef. The justification for this approach is that the import of beef is the real opportunity cost 
fo r Russian meat processors and meat traders. 
The supported domestic price is the sum of the weighted market price plus per unit 
policy transfer (all weighted subsidies). This approach has been applied because rural families, 
who own most of the private subsidiary farms, work simultaneously on large agricultural 
enterprises. The subsidies are partly absorbed by these rural families in the form of salaries 
and resources on preferential prices (feed, machinery rent, fuel , etc.) . 
For poultry, as fo r other meats, the annual average prices of imports are used as 
reference prices. Objections may be made that the poultry import consists of chicken legs, 
while the weighted market price reflects the whole carcass price. However, imported poultry 
can be considered as a perfect substitute fo r other poultry meat. Moreover, Russian 
consumers prefer legs to other chicken parts. As a result, in a situation of equal prices, 
consumers will choose legs rather a whole chicken. In addition, the general quality of 
domestically produced poultry is lower that of the imported poult ry. 
The PS Es for beef were the lowest among livestock products (Appendix B, Table 
B . l). While the cattle sector has the same level of subsidies in revenue as the hog sector, the 
share of production sold on retail markets is lower. The relatively high PSE estimates for 
pigmeat can be explained by both the significant share of the production marketed by private 
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subsidiary farms and by the level of subsidies (Appendix B, Table B .2). The same reasons 
hold true for the poultry sector. However, in 1994 the level of retail prices was probably 
affected by an import tariff Thus, some transfers to poultry producers can be connected with 
this factor (Appendix B, Table B.3). It is expected that PSE for 1995 will be significantly 
higher for this sector because import tariffs have been increased. 
4.6.2 Milk 
For milk the standard OECD procedure is used to calculate PSE (Appendix B, Table 
B.5). The New Zealand fanngate price for milk serves as a reference price. This is a 
reasonable reference price for Russia, since much of imported butter is from New Zealand. 
The estimate of transportation cost is taken from "Review of Agricultural Policy: Estonia. 
Working Party Paper. Annex 1." 
Percentage PSE for milk was negative in 1992, and reached the lowest level in 
absolute value among livestock products. In 1994, PSE for milk reached the highest positive 
value for two reasons. First, milk production in large agricultural enterprises was heavily 
subsidized by local governments because it was the main resource of milk for the urban 
population. The share of subsidies in revenue from marketed milk was the highest among 
livestock products: 36 percent in 1992, 25 percent in 1993 , and 28 percent in 1994. Second, 
both private subsidiary farms and large agricultural enterprises sold a significant amounts of 
milk on retail markets. Thus the high level of positive PSE can be attributed in part to 
entrepreneurship. 
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4.6.3 Grains 
Average prices of imported wheat, barley, and com are used as a proxy for a reference 
price for grains. These prices include transportation cost to Russian continental ports and can 
be considered as an opportunity cost for domestic grain trade companies and mills . There is 
no significant difference in transportation costs within the country between imported grain and 
domestically produced grain. On average, the transportation and handling cost of grain from 
sea ports to consuming areas is almost the same as the transportation and handling cost from 
domestic agricultural regions to the consuming areas. 
The difference in the quality of imported grains and domestically traded grain should 
be taken into account . This problem is a reality for wheat especially. Russia used to import 
high quality food wheat (hard and durum varieties with higher protein content and other 
superior quality characteristics). Reported marketed wheat production in Russia includes 
both food and feed varieties . Therefore, the average quality of domestically marketed wheat 
is lower than imported wheat. Also, Russia exports mainly feed grains (wheat and barley). 
The negative PSEs for wheat reflect a specific situation in the food market 
(Appendix B, Table B.6). Grain products are the main components of human consumption 
in Russia, and now they are even more important than before. The consumption of grain 
products has increased significantly. This conclusion cannot be extracted from official data 
on consumption. These data show that there is a sl ight increase in the consumption of 
grain products. However, before price liberalization a substantial portion of grain products 
went to feed livestock on private subsidiary farms because of a very low price and ample 
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availability of bread products compared with the high price and poor delivery system for 
concentrated feed. 
After price liberalization, market prices corrected this situation. Since that time, 
human consumption has not included feed for livestock. T herefore in reali ty, much more 
grain products are consumed directly and they play a significant role in daily diets. For 
this reason, federal and local governments consider a stable supply of grain products as a 
primary goal for food market policy. Generally, with the exemption of a few regions, they 
allow markets to clear prices. However, they use imports (from abroad and from other 
regions) to provide enough supply to keep grain product consumption at a stable level. This 
additional supply keeps retail prices at a stable level, lower than they would be otherwise. 
Can this situation be viewed as a some kind of taxation for agricultural producers 
and would agricultural producers obtain "fair" prices in the absence of this policy? In 
general, the answer to this question is no. In the short-run and even in the long-run, 
agricultural producers are not able to provide an adequate quantity of grain to match the 
goals of state social policy. Also, the average quality of domestically produced food wheat 
is lower than that available on international markets . In situations of unrestricted 
competition , domestic mills prefer to import wheat. In the extreme case, imported wheat 
can substitute for a substantial part of domestically produced wheat. As a result, 
agricultural producers will lose a huge share of the market and their total revenue could be 
even lower compared with current conditions. Another result will be increases in retail 
prices and decreased consumption, which could provoke serious social conflicts. The 
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government would be forced to subsidize imports to support socially acceptable prices. 
Due to the decrease of the domestic producers' surplus and the increase of government 
spending, the overall losses for society could be much higher compared with the current 
situation. 
The negative PSEs for corn (Appendix B, Table B.7) and barley (Appendix B , 
Table B .8) are caused by the fact that they are used mai nl y to feed livestock. This sector 
has negative PSE estimates and the demand for feed crops is the derived demand from the 
livestock sector. 
4 .6.4 Sugar beets/sugar 
The price of imported raw sugar is used as a reference price for sugar beets. This 
price reflects the opportunity cost for Russian sugar refiners. They always have a choice to 
produce white sugar from sugar beets or from imported raw sugar. 
This calculation also takes into account that since 1992, agricultural producers have 
preferred to order refiners to process sugar beets. After that agricultural enterprises sell or 
barter refined sugar on their own. Positive PSEs for sugar beets are explained partly by 
subsidies and partly by the benefit of entrepreneurship (Appendix B, Table B . l 0). Also, the 
level of domestic prices has been increasing due to the introduction of import tariffs. 
Therefore a certain part of positive PSE is connected with this facto r. This factor will be 
particularly significant in 1995 when import tariffs were raised again. 
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4.6.5 Sunflower seeds/oil 
For sunflower seeds, it is reasonable to use the approach applied for sugar beets, in 
which the price for a processed product serves as a reference price. In this case, one needs 
to use sunflower oil. Because Russia is a net importer of vegetable oil , the price of 
imported sunflower oil could be used as a proxy of the reference price for sunflower seeds. 
However, these prices are too high because imported oil is of higher quality and has a 
higher level of preparation for retail trade. For this reason, the annual average price of 
exported sunflower oil is used for the calculation of market support. These prices better 
reflect the average quality of domestically traded oil. 
In this sector agricultural producers also prefer to have processors only to extract oil 
and return oil and other byproducts (meal, etc.) to the producers of seeds. After processing 
the oil has been sold on retail and wholesale markets. In 1993 and 1994, PSE estimates for 
this crop have been around zero (Appendix B, Table B.12). This figure indicates that the 
benefits of entrepreneurship were the main factors that allowed agricultural producers to 
obtain revenues that are comparable to revenues from marketing at world prices. It is 
expected that high import tariffs on vegetable oil will raise PSE estimations in 1995. 
4.6.6 Potatoes 
The previous work by Liefert et al. does not considered potato production. However, 
this crop is an important source of income for small agricultural farrns . In a recent study, 
PSEs for potatoes are calculated (Appendix B, Table B.13). Again, prices for marketed 
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production have been distinguished between LAEs and PSFs. The average price of the potato 
export from the Czech Republic are used as a reference price. Of course, the best choice 
would be to choose the Poland export price for potatoes because Russia sometimes imports 
significant quantities of potatoes from this country. However, these prices were not available. 
Furthermore, many Polish potatoes were bartered. Therefore, Czech prices are considered as 
a proxy for Poland prices. 
Starting with negative numbers in 1992 and 1993, the PSE for potatoes became 
positive in 1994 (64 percent) . However, this sector of agricultural production did not receive 
notable government support: there are no direct subsidies and import tariffs do not play a 
significant role for pricing on retail markets (see Appendix A, T able A.5, p.102) . One source 
of the positive PSE is a compensation for entrepreneurship because PSFs sell their potatoes 
on retail markets. Another source is the depreciation of the exchange rate, which makes the 
national currency more valuable with respect to the U.S. dollar. 
* * * 
In conclusion., a few main points should be emphasized. This study criticizes the PSE 
method and PSE interpretation as it has been traditionally applied and concludes that this 
method has severe limitations when applied to transition economies. Many of the conditions 
taken for granted in mature market economies cannot be assumed for transition economies, so 
the validity of PSE measures is questionable. Certainly, these measures must be interpreted 
more carefully than would no rmally apply in OECD countries. 
When PSEs are calculated with differentiated prices for two groups of agricultural 
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producers, the meat, milk, eggs, sugar beet and sunflower seed results move further away 
from the large negative figures presented by Liefert et al. and a few more positive PSEs 
appear. Grain results do not change, since large and small farms both sell to major 
processors and do not usually market grain on retail markets. The increased average prices 
reflected in these results is to a large extent due to enlrepreneurship, since higher prices 
are obtained by the group of farms that engage in direct marketing. These resu lts are likely 
to overstate the prices these farmers receive, because the cost of postharvest activities is not 
included . 
Despite these problems, PSEs have been calculated for the Russian agricultural 
sector, being especially careful in the selection of appropriate farm prices and reference prices. 
Given these assumptions and data, signjficantly different results have been obtained. These 
results are closer than those of other studies in reflecting a realistic view of the relationship 
among the prices, government support, and agricultural sector performance. However, these 
PSEs cannot be considered very reliable in comparing levels of support with OECD 
countries or even other economies in various stages of transition. When a comparison of 
domestic and border prices is used as the main indicator of support or losses, the results 
will always be less reliable where markets are immature and poorly integrated with 
external markets. 
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The ongoing economic reforms in Russia have brought about significant changes in its 
economic system and the structure of the agricultural sector. Although the path and pace of 
the reforms is contradictory in character, the general trend of the reforms is to move from a 
centrally planned system to a market economic system. The role of market forces in 
determining resource allocation and shaping the agricultural secto r has increased significantly 
in the national economy and the agricultural sector. 
At the same time, Russian agriculture has experienced substantial problems during its 
transition. Changes in the economic environment and infrastructure, inflation that caused the 
effect of price/cost squeeze, a lack of access to credit resources, and a drop in purchasing 
power of consumers of farm products have all heavily affected the sector's performance. 
These circumstances caused a drop in agricultural production., a steep reduction in 
investment, the collapse of construction and maintenance of farm equipment, and the moral 
and physical obsolescence of the production and social infrastructure. On the one hand, 
economic refo rms stimulate the growth of efficiency and private incentive in the agricultural 
sector. On the other hand, the sector requires intensive government intervention to provide a 
smooth transition without dramatic social and economic losses fo r the rural economy. The 
federal governmental programs for agriculture are targeted mainJy at fixing market failu re 
that is caused by the varying ability of different sectors of the economy to adapt to new 
economic conditions. 
85 
The development and results of economic and agrarian reforms in Russia are of 
significance for the fieid of economics. It is important to test how economic theory and 
methods developed in the framework of market economies are applicable to transition 
economies and to estimate the impacts of the reforms on economic growth and performance 
of the agricultural sector. Careful analysis of economic processes in transition economies can 
provide insights into the limitations of modem economics. 
Russia has become deeply involved in the international trade of agricultural 
commodities. Therefore, the changes in Russian domestic markets and government policy 
toward agriculture may have a substantial impact on international markets and on the 
development of agricultural sectors in other countries. 
This study had three major objectives: ( 1) to describe the general development of the 
national economy and the agricultural sector in Russia in the early 1990s; (2) to provide an 
analysis of agricultural programs using microeconomic methods and instruments; and (3) to 
estimate the overall effect of agricultural policy on the sector using producer subsidy 
equivalents. 
This thesis has been organized into 5 chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the background, 
the problem setting and the objectives of the study. Chapter 2 presents a quantitative 
assessment of the changes in the agricultural sector's performance in Russia, the farm 
structure, food consumption, and agricultural trade. Chapter 3 describes the structure of the 
agricultural policy of the Russian federal government. The majority of this chapter is devoted 
to the analysis of the most important agricultural programs: price supports, minimum 
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guaranteed prices, input subsidies, leasing programs, agricultural credit, and import tariffs. 
Chapter 3 uses typical instruments of microeconomic theory to demonstrate and explain the 
results of government interventions in the agricultural sector. This analysis provides useful 
information for Russia's policy makers in assessing the relationship between the goals and 
results of agricultural policy. Chapter 4 presents the results of estimating producer subsidy 
equivalents (PSEs) for Russian agriculture. The study uses modified approaches to calculate 
PSEs compared with the previous work and takes into consideration the existence of three 
major groups of agricultural producers that have different market channels and face different 
prices on the market. 
The PSEs were estimated for the period 1992, 1993 and 1994 for the following 
major commodities: beef, pigmeat, poultry, milk, eggs, wheat, com, barley, sugar beets, 
sunflower seeds, and potatoes. The results do not support the hypothesis that the agricultural 
sector in Russia is heavily taxed. Also, the calculations show that positive PSEs can be 
explained by the benefits of entrepreneurship rather than government intervention. 
Several major conclusions can be made based upon the study. 
First, economic reforms have radically changed the structure of agricultural 
production and the economic environment for the agricultural sector. The sector not only 
reduced production but also lost a significant part of the food market that is now occupied 
by imported food products. The price/costs squeeze effect has caused a significant decrease 
in farm incomes and a degradation of the production infrastructure. The changes in relative 
prices have caused the current structure of agricultural capital to become inefficient for 
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conducting business in the new economic environment. The restructuring of the agricultural 
sector has developed more slowly than in other sectors of the economy. Therefore, the 
transition period will be long and the sector requires governmental support (albeit of a 
different type than in the past) to ease thi s transformation. 
Second, the major motivation of agricultural policy is to fix market failures that are 
caused by varying speeds of restructuring in other sectors of the economy. The purpose of 
the introduction of some agricultural programs is to prevent significant economic and social 
losses that can be caused by imbalances in the national economy. 
Third, governmental intervention has different structures on the federal and local 
levels. The federal government has supported mainly seed and pedigree livestock production, 
has compensated for costs associated with fertilizer, chemicals and fuel, has written off 
debts, has developed leasing of machinery, and has developed a credit system. The regional 
governments subsidize primarily livestock production. However, a common feature of federal 
and local agricultural policy is that they both support the rural economy only through large 
agricultural enterprises while smaJI farm units that produce 40 percent of agricultu ral output 
are ignored. 
Fourth, some agricultural programs have not accomplished their stated goals and 
often produced an adverse effect. Preferential credits have been used mainly for 
nonagricultural purposes. Write-offs have increased the state debt and could have an adverse 
effect on the national economy and agriculture as well. Livestock subsidies have tended to 
decrease the procurement price for agricultural producers and the overall effect is ambiguous. 
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Input subsidies and leasing programs have provoked price increases fo r machinery and 
equipment. 
Fifth, the foreign trade policy favors domestic producers and the federal budget. At 
the same time, consumers have to pay higher prices for imported food products because of a 
low supply of domestically produced products. Also, import tariffs on food products do not 
protect agricultural producers because most gains go to the processors. 
Sixth, in order to obtain correct PSE estimations fo r Russian agriculture the different 
groups of producers and marketing channels should be distinguished along with an adequate 
assessment of prices that these groups face on the market. 
Seventh, the negative PSE estimates obtained using the standard methodology cannot 
be interpreted as some kind of taxation fo r agricultural producers because Russian agricultural 
markets are not fully integrated in international t rade and low domestic prices reflect the 
appropriate result of market clearance between domestic supply and domestic demand. The 
positive PSE estimates are caused not by significant government support but rather by 
benefits from entrepreneurship when agricultural producers go directly to retai l markets or sell 
processed products. 
Using the results of this study selected recommendations can be made for developing 
agricultural policy in Russia. 
The government should eliminate input subsidies to agricultu ral producers because 
input supply is inelastic: the more the government intervenes, the faster the disparity rises and 
the wider the price scissors becomes. For example, Poland and the Czech Republic 
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experienced the same problem: sharp price disparity followed the introduction of input 
subsidies. When subsidies were removed, the disparity evened out. Government support 
should stimulate the market relationship between producers and input suppliers. Many of the 
existing problems could be resolved simply by credit and leasing carried out not by the 
governments but directly by private firms. 
Agricultural poLicy needs to be developed that takes into account the fact that 
agricultural production is shifting from large fanns and complexes to small producing units 
based on single families or groups of families. 
The introduction of import tariffs will not stimulate domestic producers to improve 
the quality of food products and to be more competitive with fo reign producers. Therefore, 
import tariffs can be replaced by import quotas that can be allocated through actions. 
Russia occupies a huge territory and regional markets have different levels of 
development, functioning sometimes as closed markets due to a poorly developed market 
infrastructure. Thus, PSE estimates obtained for the Russian agricultural sector as a whole do 
not reflect the specific situations in different regions. In order to obtain estimates of the 
overall effects of government regulation on agricultural sectors in various regions, the PSE 
approach should be significantly modified. 
The credit systems for agriculture must be changed significantly, targeting three goals: 
to make long-term credit available for efficient fanns, to stimulate the restructuring of large 
agricultural enterprises, and to prevent the use of loans for nonagricultural purposes. In order 
to accompLish these goals new regulations must be implemented to obtain loans for 
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agricultural purposes with a description of conditions and strict procedures to control how 
these financial resources are used. The Ministry of Finance, and the Central Bank should work 
with the Ministry of Agriculture to develop and implement these regulations. It assumes that 
certain economic and legal conditions will be established for the development of asset 
markets. 
Write-offs of agricultural debts should be permanently excluded forever from 
agricultural policy because they make the entire system of agricultural credits inefficient and 
distort the incentive systems for agriculture. 
The federal government should establish reasonable and clear targets for its support to 
the agricultural sector for an extended period, at least the period between presidential 
elections. These targets can include, for example, restructuring support (including bankruptcy 
procedures), social services support, income support and preferential credits. In this case the 
agricultural sector should be considered as a structure that includes both large and small 
producing units. All sources of income should be taken into account. Long-term loans with 
low interest rates should be available for all types of agricultural producers that will satisfy 
predetermined conditions. This system will stimulate the development of the most efficient 
production units and provide opportunities for the smooth restructuring of the entire 
agricultural sector. 
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APPENDIX A. TABLES WITH AGRICULTURAL DATA 
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Table A 1 Number of livestock (rrullion) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1994/ 
1990, % 
Number of cattle, total 58.8 57 54.7 52.2 49 
- large agricultural enterprises 49.3 47.2 43 .9 40.2 36 
- private subsidiary farms 9.5 9.9 10.8 1 1.6 12 
- peasant fanns ... . .. . .. 0.4 1 
Number of hogs, total 40 38.3 3 5.4 31.5 29 
- large agricultural enterprises 33 .8 3 1.2 27.6 23 .5 20 
- private subsidiary fanns 6.2 7.1 7.8 7.8 8 
- peasant farms ... . .. ... 0.2 0 
Number of sheep, total 6 1.3 58 .2 55 .3 51.4 44 
- large agricultural enterprises 45.4 41.6 37.6 32.3 26 
- private subsidiary fanns 13 13.6 14.6 15.2 14 
- peasant fanns 0.7 1 
Sources: 
Production and econorruc data on the agro-industrial complex of Russia in 1994, pp. 34 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1994. pp. 343, 346 
Livestock in the Russian Federation, 1992, p. 6-7 
The Russian Federation in 1992. pp. 471 
83% 
74% 
126% 
72% 
60% 
127% 
71% 
56% 
109% 
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Table A.2 Planted area by crop (million ha) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total planted area 118 116 115 111 105 
All grains 63 62 62 6 1 56 
Winter wheat 9.7 9.2 10.8 10.5 7.8 
Spring wheat 14.5 14.0 13.5 14.2 14.4 
Barley 13 .7 15 .2 14.5 15.4 16.4 
Rye 8.0 6.5 7.6 6.0 3.9 
Sun.flower seeds 2.7 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.1 
Sugar beets 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1 
Potatoes 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.3 
Vegetables 0.61 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.74 
Feed crops 44.6 44.0 42.5 41.0 39.6 
Fallow 13.8 14.7 13 .0 13 .5 16.9 
Source: 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995. p. 361 
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Table A3 Crop yields (centner/ha) and livestock productivity* 
1986-
1990** 
All grains 
Winter wheat 
Spring wheat 
Sunflower seed 
Sugar beet 
Potatoes 
Vegetable 
Beef*** 
Pork*** 
Milk yield, kg per cow 
Eggs, per hen 
Wool, kg per head 
* - l centner = 0.1 metric ton 
** - annual average 
15 .9 
28.2 
1 1.9 
12.7 
225 
108 
154 
121 
118 
2731 
236 
3.9 
* * * - kg of liveweight per head unit 
1991 
14.4 
28.1 
9.4 
11.2 
174 
108 
146 
112 
111 
2567 
23 1 
3.7 
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995. pp.363, 372 
1992 
17.2 
26.2 
13 .3 
10.8 
178 
113 
137 
102 
102 
2332 
224 
3.4 
1993 1994 l 99 l-
1994* 
16.3 14.4 15.6 
25 .9 22. l 25 .6 
l 1.5 10.4 11.2 
9.4 8.1 9.9 
191 126 167.3 
106 101 107.0 
135 129 136.8 
LOO 89 100.8 
103 95 102.8 
2328 21 62 2347.3 
222 214 222.8 
3.3 3.0 3.4 
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Table A.4 Structure of selected retail prices in 1994, %. 
Retail price Agriculture Industry Trade 
Milk 100 30.9 52.9 16.2 
Butter 100 60.3 25.5 14.2 
Beef 100 53 .9 30.8 15.3 
Pork 100 55.6 29.4 15.0 
Wheat flour 100 43.5 35.4 21.1 
Sunflower oi l 100 39.6 39 .4 21.0 
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995. p.300. 
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Table A.5 Crop production : direct subsidies and prices for large agricultural enterprises 
(rubles per ton) 
1992 1993 1994 
All grains 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 8620 44690 115500 
- market price 8370 43690 112190 
- subsidy 250 1000 3310 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 2.9 2.2 2.9 
Sunflower seed 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 17120 73250 312750 
- market price 16660 72220 310250 
- subsidy 460 1030 2500 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 2.7 1.4 0.8 
Sugar beets 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 2300 20570 61150 
- market price 2230 20110 58900 
- subsidy 70 460 2250 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 3.0 2.2 3.7 
Potatoes 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 8410 56270 272810 
- market price 8100 54940 269670 
- subsidy 310 1330 3140 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 3.7 2.4 1.2 
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Table A.6 Livestock production: direct subsidies and prices for large agricultural enterprises 
(rubles per ton) 
1992 1993 1994 
Cattle 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 40000 341730 932180 
- market price 24120 275510 778020 
- subsidy 15880 66220 154160 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 39.7 19.4 16.5 
Hogs 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 51090 528420 1534690 
- market price 33180 439430 1237250 
- subsidy 17910 88990 297440 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 35.1 16.8 19.4 
Sheep 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 34710 230260 673560 
- market price 13400 180500 484840 
- subsidy 21310 49760 188720 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 61.4 21.6 28.0 
Poultry 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 48000 533360 1723330 
- market price 30670 470880 1474160 
- subsidy 17330 62480 249170 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 36.1 11. 7 14.5 
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Table A.6 continued 
1992 1993 1994 
Milk 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 8920 64820 210970 
- market price 5670 48490 152270 
- subsidy 3250 16330 58700 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 36.4 25.2 27.8 
Wool 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 178090 643250 2205220 
- market price 178090 423280 970600 
- subsidy 0 219970 1234620 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 0.0 34.2 56.0 
Eggs (per 1000) 
- revenue (market price + subsidy) 2648 25110 210970 
- market price 2018 21833 152270 
- subsidy 630 3277 58700 
- share of subsidy in revenue, % 23.8 13.1 27.8 
Sources: 
Basic Indicators of Agro-industrial Complex. of Russia in 1993 , Part r, p.34 
Production and Economic Data on Agro-industrial Complex of Russia in 1994, Part r, p.36 
Table A.7 Import of agricultural products 
1992 
quantity, value, unit 
thou . min. price, 
tons USD USD 
Red meat 288 383 1330 
Poul try 46 47 1022 
Milk, dried 46 99 2152 
Butter 25 40 1600 
Wheat 17593 2563 146 
Barley 3967 505 127 
Corn 5490 827 15 l 
Soy oil 224 131 585 
Sunflower oil 181 104 575 
Sugar, raw 2137 582 272 
Sugar, refined 1554 582 375 
Sources: 
Russi.an Federation in 1992, p. 54-55. 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1994. p. 436-437 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995. p. 435. 
quantity, 
thou. 
tons 
85 
74 
15 
70 
5699 
655 
4391 
32 
52 
1667 
1442 
1993 1994 
value, unit quantity, value, unit 
min. pnce, thou. min. pnce, 
USD USD tons USD USD 
11 6 1365 358 415 1159 
73 986 496 441 889 
38 2533 34 62 1824 
95 1357 103 133 1291 
838 147 1181 161 136 
75 I 15 15 1 79 
619 141 864 179 207 
22 688 21 14 696 
39 750 53 59 111 3 
489 293 1081 314 290 
582 404 369 137 371 
Table A. 8 Export of agricultural products 
1992 
quantity, value, unit 
thou. min. price, 
tons USO USO 
Red meat 0.1 0.5 5000 
Poultry 21.2 1.1 52 
Milk, dried 7.7 9.5 627 
Butter 0 0 
Wheat 2.7 0.2 74 
Barley 1.8 
Com 0.6 0.1 167 
Soy oil 1.5 I 667 
Sunflower oil 0.3 0.2 667 
Sugar, raw 0 0 
Sugar, refined 6.2 1.6 258 
Sources: 
Russian Federation in 1992, p. 54-55. 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1994. p. 436-437 
Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1995. p. 435. 
quantity, 
thou. 
tons 
0.05 
0.6 
13.4 
0 
1.8 
2.5 
10.6 
0 
O. l 
0 
0.07 
1993 
value, unit quantity, 
mln. pnce, thou. 
USO USD tons 
0.03 600 1.8 
0.1 167 0.5 
8.4 627 52.9 
0 0.1 
0.2 111 18.6 
0.3 120 264.0 
1.2 113 13.9 
0 0.1 
0.05 500 56.9 
0 ?? 1.2 
0.03 429 6. 1 
1994 
value, 
min. 
USO 
1.7 
0.3 
38.2 
0.1 
1.6 
18. l 
1.2 
0.0 
29.0 
0.4 
2. l 
unit 
price, 
USO 
944 
600 
722 
1000 
86 
69 
86 
667 
510 
333 
344 
....... 
0 
0 
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APPENDIX B. TABLES WITH PSEs CALCULATION 
102 
Table B.1 Estimation of PSEs for beef and veal 
l Production marketed, total (live) 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - private subsidiary farms 
4 Production marketed, total (carcass) 
5 - large agricultural enterprises 
6 - private subsidiary farms 
7 Weighted market price (carcass): 
8 - large agricultural enterprises* 
9 - private subsidiary farms** 
10 All subsidies 
11 Subsidies per unit (carcass) (10/4) 
12 Supported domestic price (7+11) 
13 Reference price (carcass)*** 
14 Exchange rate 
15 Converted reference price ( 13*14) 
16 Unit PSE (12-15) 
17 Percentage PSE (16/12"100) 
*-annual average procurement price 
* * - annual average city market price 
* * * - average price of import 
Units 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou . tons 
thou. rubles/ ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
billion rubles 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ ton 
USD/ton 
rubles/USD 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
% 
1992 1993 1994 
6081 5435 4750 
4681 3835 3100 
1400 1600 1650 
3223 2881 2518 
248 1 2033 1643 
742 848 875 
62 895 2594 
46 520 1468 
119 1795 4710 
153 675 1203 
47 234 478 
110 1129 3072 
1330 1365 1159 
205 962 2276 
273 1313 2638 
-163 -1 84 434 
-148 -16 14 
Note: Production marketed by large agricultural enterprises in 1994 was defined on the basis of 
percentage structure of 1993 using the information on overall livestock sales. Production 
marketed by private subsidiary farms was defined on the basis of the changes in the structure of 
livestock herds. 
Table B.2 Estimation of PSEs for pigmeat 
1 Production marketed, total (live) 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - private subsidiary farms 
4 Production marketed, total (carcass) 
5 - large agricultural enterprises 
6 - private subsidiary farms 
7 Weighted market price (carcass): 
8 - large agricultural enterprises* 
9 - private subsidiary farms** 
10 All subsidies 
11 Subsidies per unit (carcass) (10/4) 
12 Supported domestic price (7+11) 
13 Reference price (carcass)*** 
14 Exchange rate 
15 Converted reference price ( 13*14) 
16 Unit PSE (12-15) 
17 Percentage PSE (16/12*100) 
*- annual average procurement price 
** - annual average city market price 
*** - average price of import 
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Units 1992 1993 1994 
thou. tons 3576 3138 2990 
thou. tons 1676 1257 1080 
thou. tons 1900 1881 1910 
thou. tons 2539 2228 2123 
thou. tons 11 90 892 767 
thou. tons 1349 1336 1356 
thou. rubles/ton 180 1540 4236 
thou. rubles/ton 44 619 1743 
thou. rubles/ton 300 2155 5646 
billion rubles 65 333 579 
thou. rubles/ton 26 149 273 
thou. rubles/ton 206 1689 4509 
USO/ton 1330 1365 1159 
rubles/USD 205 962 2276 
thou. rubles/ton 273 1313 2638 
thou. rubles/ton -67 376 1871 
% -33 22 41 
Table B.3 Estimation of PSEs for poultry. 
l Production marketed, total (live) 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - private subsidiary fanns 
4 Production marketed, total (carcass) 
5 - large agricultural enterprises 
6 - private subsidiary fanns 
7 Weighted market price (carcass): 
8 - large agricultural enterprises* 
9 - private subsidiary fanns* * 
10 All subsidies 
11 Subsidies per unit (carcass) (10/4) 
12 Supported domestic price (7+11) 
13 Reference price (carcass)*** 
14 Exchange rate 
15 Converted reference price ( 13*14) 
16 Unit PSE (12-15) 
17 Percentage PSE (16/12"'100) 
*-annual average procurement price 
* * - annual average city market price 
*** - average price of import 
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Units 1992 1993 1994 
thou. tons 2067 1844 1620 
thou. tons 1367 1244 1020 
thou. tons 700 600 600 
thou. tons 1881 1678 1474 
thou. tons 1244 1132 928 
thou. tons 637 546 546 
thou. rubles/ton 91 924 2382 
thou. rubles/ton 34 523 1638 
thou. rubles/ton 200 1755 3646 
billion rubles 66 328 719 
thou. rubles/ton 35 195 488 
thou. rubles/ton 126 1120 2869 
USD/ton 1022 986 889 
rubles/USO 205 962 2276 
thou. rubles/ton 210 949 2023 
thou. rubles/ton -84 171 846 
% -67 15 29 
Table B.4 Estimation of PSEs for eggs 
l Production marketed, total: 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - private subsidiary farms 
4 Weighted market price: 
5 - large agricultural enterprises* 
6 - private subsidiary farms** 
7 Conversion coefficient (eggs to kg) 
8 Handling margin 
9 Adjusted market price (4"'7"'1.25): 
10 All subsidies 
11 Subsidies per unit (7/1) 
12 Supported domestic price (9+11) 
13 Reference price * * 
14 Exchange rate 
15 Converted reference price (13* 14) 
16 Unit PSE (9- 15) 
17 Percentage PSE (16/12"'100) 
*- annual average procurement price 
** - EU export price 
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Units 
thou. tons 
mln. eggs 
mln. eggs 
thou. rubles/1000 
thou. rubles/I 000 
thou. rubles/ton 
% 
thou. rubles/tons 
billion rubles 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/too 
USD/ton 
rubles/USO 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
% 
1992 1993 1994 
27871 26199 23600 
27871 26199 23600 
2 49 152 
2 49 152 
0.056 0.056 0.056 
25 25 25 
45 1083 3400 
54 302 874 
2 12 37 
47 1094 3437 
713 793 784 
205 962 2276 
146 763 1784 
-99 331 1652 
-211 30 48 
Table B .5 Estimation of PSEs for milk 
1 Production marketed, total: 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - private subsidiary farms 
4 Weighted market price: 
5 - large agricultural enterprises* 
6 - private subsidiary farms** 
7 All subsidies 
8 Subsidies per unit (7/ 1) 
9 Supported domestic price (7+11) 
10 Fat content - domestic 
11 Fat content - New Zealand 
12 Transport cost, milk equivalent 
13 Reference price * * * 
14 Adjusted reference price **** 
15 Exchange rate 
16 Converted reference price ( 14*1 5) 
17 Unit PSE (12-15) 
18 Percentage PSE (17/9"'100) 
*-annual average procurement price 
** - annual average city market price 
* * * - New Zealand farmgate price 
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Units 
thou . tons 
thou . tons 
thou . tons 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou . rubles/ton 
thou . rubles/ton 
billion rubles 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
% 
% 
USD/ton 
USD/ton 
USD/ton 
rubles/USD 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
% 
**** - price adjusted to domestic fat content and transportation cost 
1992 1993 1994 
41644 41371 36000 
26844 25271 19700 
14800 16100 16300 
19 96 458 
6 49 152 
44 170 828 
210 948 2085 
5 23 58 
24 119 516 
3.50 3.50 3 .50 
4 .73 4 .73 4.73 
17 18 18 
144 138 144 
124 120 124 
205 962 2276 
25 115 283 
-l 3 234 
-4 3 45 
Table B .6 Estimation of PSEs for wheat 
1 Production marketed, total: 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - peasant farms 
4 Weighted market price: 
5 - large agricultural enterprises* 
6 - peasant farms* 
7 All subsidies 
8 Subsidies per unit (7 /1) 
9 Supported domestic price (4+8) 
10 Reference price * * 
11 Exchange rate 
12 Converted reference price (I O* 11) 
13 Unit PSE (9-12) 
14 Percentage PSE (13/9*100) 
* - annual average procurement price 
** - average price of import 
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Un.its 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
billion rubles 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
USD/ton 
rubles/USO 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
O/o 
1992 1993 1994 
21 746 22773 15435 
2 1320 2211 0 14700 
426 663 735 
8 48 106 
8 48 106 
8 48 106 
138 526 482 
6 23 31 
15 71 137 
146 147 140 
205 962 2276 
30 141 319 
- 15 -70 -181 
-106 -98 -132 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity 
Table B .7 E stimation of PSEs fo r com 
l Production marketed, total: 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - peasant farms 
4 Weighted market price: 
5 - large agricultural enterprises* 
6 - peasant farms 
7 AU subsidies 
8 Subsidies per unit (711) 
9 Supported domestic price (4+8) 
10 Reference price ** 
11 Exchange rate 
12 Converted reference price ( l O* 11) 
13 Unit PSE (9-1 2) 
14 Percentage PSE (13/9"'100) 
•-annual average procurement price 
* * - average price of import 
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Units 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
billion rubles 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
USD/ton 
rubles/USO 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
% 
1992 1993 1994 
1113 559 361 
109 1 543 344 
22 16 17 
9 58 251 
9 58 251 
9 58 251 
14 2 1 18 
13 38 49 
21 96 299 
146 147 145 
205 962 2276 
30 14 1 330 
-9 -46 -3 1 
-40 -48 -10 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity 
Table B .8 Estimation of PSEs fo r barley 
1 Production marketed, total: 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - peasant farms 
4 Weighted market price: 
5 - large agricultural enterprises* 
6 - peasant farms 
7 All subsidies 
8 Subsidies per unit (7/ 1) 
9 Supported domestic price (4+8) 
10 Reference price * * 
11 Exchange rate 
12 Converted reference price ( l 0* 1 I) 
13 Unit PSE (9-12) 
14 Percentage PSE (13/9• lOO) 
* - annual average procurement price 
** - average price of import 
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Units 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. ru hies/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
billion rubles 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
USD/ton 
rubles/USO 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
O/ o 
1992 1993 1994 
6863 6748 6517 
6729 655 1 6207 
135 197 310 
6 38 77 
6 38 77 
6 38 77 
6 143 119 
l 21 18 
7 59 95 
127 11 5 79 
205 962 2276 
26 11 1 180 
- 19 -52 -85 
-274 -88 -90 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity 
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Table B.9 Estimation of PSEs fo r sugarbeet/sugar 
Units 1992 1993 1994 
1 Production marketed, total : thou. tons 11209 7422 1358 
2 - large agricultural enterprises thou. tons 10989 7143 1312 
3 - peasant farms thou. tons 220 279 46 
4 Weighted market price: thou. rubles/ton 2 20 59 
5 - large agricultural enterprises * thou. rubles/ton 2 20 59 
6 - peasant farms thou. rubles/ton 3 24 56 
7 All subsidies billion rubles 29 80 33 
8 Subsidies per unit (7/l) thou. rubles/ton 3 11 24 
9 Supported domestic price (4+8) thou. rubles/ton 5 31 83 
10 Coefficient (beet to sugar) % 11 12 13 
11 Retail price for sugar thou. rubles/ton 88 494 910 
12 Reference price ** USO/ton 272 293 290 
13 Exchange rate rubles/USO 205 962 2276 
14 Converted reference price (13*14) thou. rubles/ton 56 282 660 
15 CRP in terms of beet (14*10/100) thou. rubles/ton 6 33 83 
16 Unit PSE (9-15) thou. rubles/ton - 1 -2 -1 
17 Percentage PSE (16/9• 100) O/o -23 -7 -1 
*-annual average procurement price 
** - annual average price of imported raw sugar 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity 
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Table B . l 0 Estimation of PSEs for sugarbeet/sugar (alternative approach) 
Unjts 1992 1993 1994 
1 Production (beet) thou. tons 25548 25468 13901 
2 Production marketed (beet) thou. tons 11209 7422 1358 
3 Production exchanged fo r sugar (beet) thou. tons 14339 18046 12543 
4 Coefficient (beet to sugar) % l 1 12 13 
5 Sugar received from exchange thou. tons 1506 2117 1587 
6 Market price (beet) thou. rubles/ton 2 20 59 
7 Market price (sugar, wholesale) thou. rubles/ton 58 329 607 
8 Weighted market price: thou. rubles/ ton 4 33 75 
9 All subsidies billion rubles 29 80 33 
10 Subsidies per unit (7/ 1) thou. rubles/ton 3 11 24 
11 Supported domestic price (8+11) thou. rubles/ ton 7 44 99 
12 Retail price for sugar thou. rubles/ton 88 494 910 
13 Reference price ** USO/ton 272 293 290 
14 Exchange rate rubles/USD 205 962 2276 
15 Converted reference price (13*14) thou. rubles/ton 56 282 660 
16 CRP in terms of beet (15*4/100)/ thou. rubles/ton 6 33 83 
17 U nit PSE (beet) (11-16) thou. rubles/ton 1 11 16 
18 Percentage PSE (17/11*100) % 16 25 16 
* - annual average procurement price 
** - annual average price of imported raw sugar 
Note: the value fo r peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity 
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Table B .11 Estimatio n of PSEs for sunflower seeds 
l Production marketed, total: 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - peasant farms 
4 Weighted market price: 
5 - large agricultural enterprises* 
6 - peasant fanns** 
7 All subsidies 
8 Subsidies per unit (711) 
9 Supported domestic price (4+8) 
10 Reference price * * 
I I Exchange rate 
12 Converted reference price (IO* 11 ) 
13 Unit PSE (9-1 2) 
14 Percentage PSE (13/9~100) 
* - annual average procurement price 
** - c.i.f price to Baltic ports 
Units 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. tons 
thou. rubles/ ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
billion rubles 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ ton 
USD/ton 
rubles/USD 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou. rubles/ton 
% 
1992 1993 1994 
1609 1538 1507 
1521 1399 1368 
88 139 140 
17 72 310 
17 72 310 
17 72 310 
37 31 17 
23 20 11 
39 92 321 
287 328 315 
205 962 2276 
59 316 71 7 
-1 9 -223 -396 
-~9 -242 -123 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity 
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Table B .12 Estimation of PSEs fo r sunflower seed/oil (alternative approach) 
Units 1992 1993 1994 
1 Production (seed) thou. tons 3110 2765 2553 
2 Production marketed (seed) thou. tons 1609 1538 1507 
3 Production exchanged for oil (seed) thou. tons 758 1211 710 
4 Coefficient (seed to oil) % 42 41 41 
5 Oil received from product exchange thou. tons 318 496 291 
6 Market price (seed) thou. rubles/ton 17 72 310 
7 Market price (oil, wholesale) thou. rubles/ton 58 584 2028 
8 Weighted market price: thou. rubles/ton 19 146 477 
9 All subsidies billion rubles 29 80 33 
10 Subsidies per unit (711) thou. rubles/ton 18 52 22 
11 Supported domestic price (8+10) thou. rubles/ton 37 198 499 
12 Retail price for oil thou. rubles/ton 70 707 2454 
13 Reference price ** USD/ton 667 500 510 
14 Exchange rate rubles/USD 205 962 2276 
15 Converted reference price ( 13 * 14) thou. rubles/ton 137 481 1161 
16 CRP in terms of seed (15*4/100) thou. rubles/ton 57 197 476 
17 Unit PSE (seed) (11-16) thou. rubles/ton -21 0 23 
18 Percentage PSE (17/11*100) O/o -56 0 5 
* - annual average procurement price 
* * - annual average price of exported sunflower oil 
Note: the value for peasant farms is calculated using a share in total production of the commodity 
Table B . 13 Estimations of PSEs for potatoes 
1 Production marketed, total: 
2 - large agricultural enterprises 
3 - private subsidiary farms 
4 Weighted market price: 
5 - large agricultural enterprises* 
6 - private subsidiary farms** 
7 All subsidies 
8 Subsidies per unit (7/ 1) 
9 Supported domestic price {4+8) 
10 Reference price * * * 
11 Exchange rate 
12 Converted reference price (1O*11 ) 
13 Unit PSE (9-12) 
14 Percentage PSE (13/9*100) 
*-annual average procurement price 
** - annual average city market price 
* * * - average price of export from Czech 
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Units 
thou. tons 
thou . tons 
thou . tons 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou . rubles/ton 
thou . rubles/ton 
billion rubles 
thou . rubles/to n 
thou. rubles/ton 
USD/ton 
rubles/USD 
thou. rubles/ton 
thou . ru bles/ton 
O/o 
Note: sales for PSF are based upon the data from budget surveys 
1992 1993 1994 
2964 3402 2748 
2732 2131 1350 
232 1271 1398 
9 72 462 
8 55 270 
26 100 647 
I 3 4 
0 l 2 
10 73 463 
97 127 74 
205 962 2276 
20 122 168 
-1 0 -50 295 
-103 -68 64 
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